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A Re-Analysis of NEG-RAISING in English* 
Jay M. Pollack 
1. Introduction. 
A rule o·f Nll;-RAISING (also called NEG-TRANSPORATION NOT-, --TRANSPORATION and NOT- HOPPING) was proposed originally in Fillmore 
(1963) to account for the similarity in meaning of (la) and (lb) . 
(1) a. John thinks Sally hasn't left. 
b . John doesn't think Sally has left . 
Sentence (lb) is ambiguous . One of its meanings is the negation of 
(2) . 
{2) John thinks Sally has left . 
while the other meaning is the same as that of (la). It was claimed 
that the deep structure of one of the readings of (lb) is the deep 
structure (la) and that the not is raised from the complement clause 
to the main clause. 
Since its original proposal, the rule has been used in several 
places as part of arguments in many different types of analyses . 
However, NEG-RAISING itself has never been su:fficiently Justified for 
one to be able to assun,e its existence, as many people have. This 
paper, in addition to reviewing the published syntactic arguments for 
llEXr-RAISING and the problems they raise, will suggest that the rule 
vould be more trouble i;han it is vorth (part 2) . After a brief look at 
the semantic and illocutionary factors involved (part 3) , an alternative 
fram.evork, namely, the one developed in Jackendoff (1972), v.lll be 
adopted and a sell!ADtic interpretation rule of NEG-ASSOCIATION will be 
proposed t o replace NEG-RAISING (part 4) . Then the new framework and 
rule will be tested on the data which originally motivated the trans-
formation (part 5 ) , after which is a summary of the results of this 
paper (part 6) . 
2 . The Syntactic Evidence and Its Problems. 
2.1. Until 
2.1.1 . The vord until seems to have the following selectional 
restrictions on it: it may appea.-r in a sentence only vith (a) a durative 
verb {compare {3a) and (3b)) 
( 3) a . Mary slept until noon. 
b. *Mary voke up until noon . 
(b} vith a plural subject , giving a punctue.J. verb a durative sense 
( compare (4a) and (4b)) 
190 
191 
(4) a. Guests arrived until 5 o'clock. 
b . *The Brazilian ambassador arrived until 5 o'clock. 
or (c) with a negative (Compare (5a) and (5b)). 
(5) a . I didn't get my present until Thursday . 
b . *I got my present until Thursday. 
Now consider examples (6)-(8) 
(6) *I think the trial will finish until next month. 
(7) I think the trial won't finish until next month. 
(8) I don't think the trial will finish until next month . 
If sentence (8) were merel y the negation of (6), then it would be 
ungrammatical, like (6) is. However, since (8) is grammatical, the 
argument goes, it must have come from (7) by NEG- RAISING, thereby 
satisfying the requirement that until co-occur with a negative in the 
same sentence. 
2 .1. 2. The above data were first not iced by Klima (1964). He also 
found sentences like the following: 
(9) a . She is too weak to have another child until 1978 . 
b . Bill is afraid to leave until his mother comes. 
c . I doubt he will arrive until next week. 
d . My diet forbids me to eat until mealtime. 
e. Scarcely anybody expected him to resign until 
next year. 
None of these examples contains an overt negative anywhere in the 
sentence, yet they permit a construction with until. To handle these 
cases, Klima proposed a rule of NEG- ABSORPTION which, instead of 
raising a negative, would delete the lower negative, if there were a 
.221 or an ' i nherently negative constituent ' (into which class would 
fall forbid, too, afraid , doubt, scarcel,Y) in the main sentence. Thus 
(8) would have a structure something like (lO)and NEG2 would absorb 
NEG1, giving the surface structure of (8). 
(10) I NEG2 think (the trial. NEG1 will finish until next 
week.] 
This rule presents a problem for a theory in which transformations 
are meaning-preserving. Lindholm (1969) points out that sentence (7), 
which has the same meaning as (8), has a different underlying structure, 
namely, like (10) , but without NEG. Thus , two synonymous sentences 
differ in that one, (7), has one NEG and the other, (8) has two NEGs 
on a more underlying level of representation . This would imply that 
Nil-ABSORPTION changes meaning. 
There is another serious problem, as pointed out in Jackendoff 
(1971), for sentences that have a surface negative: 
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{11) Bill is afraid not to leave . 
(12) Ali is too clever not to win. 
If (ll)and (12) have undergone NEG-A1lSORPl'ION, then they must have 
started with two negatives in the auxiliary position in the lower 
sentence, which means that the base rules must be complicated, sacri-
ficing a generalization about negation for an explanation of until. 
2 .1,3, If, instead of NEG-A1lSORPl'ION, we try breaking dovn the 
inherently negative lexical items into more abstract semantic elements 
containing overt negatives in the lower sentence, as in {13) , 
(13) a . so •.•that ...not+ too 
b. ;;- afraid t~..not + afraid 
c . tend to believe... not + doubt 
d. order•..not + doubt 
e. almost no+ scarcely any 
then the sentences in (9) would satisfy the selectional restriction 
for until in deep structure and lexical insertion rules would apply 
later to give the surface items . This solution would not require two 
negatives to be generated in one simplex sentence by the base rules. 
But even this solution cannot explain the ungrammaticality of 
{llia) and (14b) . 
(14) a. *I don ' t doubt she will come until tomorrow. 
b. *Bill isn' t afraid to leave until his moth@r com@s. 
Sentence (14a), which, by this proposal, would have a _negative in the 
lower sentence with until, shoul<l be all right . If it is suggested that 
the negative in the main clause causes the lexical insertion rule which 
forms doubt to block, then sentence (15a) would also be prohibited, 
which is obviously not the case. 
(15) a. I don' t doubt she will come. 
b. Bill isn ' t afraid to leave. 
Calling don't doubt another special lexical item is an even more ad 
hoc solution and doesn't even seem plausible for the not afraid case 
in (14b)-(l4b) . 
2.1 . 4 . Selectional restrictions are generally agreedtbese days (cf. 
Mccawley 1968, Jackendoff 1972:ch . l) to be semantic well-formedness 
conditions, rather than syntactic, as was supposed in Chomsky (1965). 
If, as Jackendoff (1972) claims, surface structure contributes to the 
semantic representation of a sentence, then a syntactic rule of NEG-
RAISING is not needed to account for sentences (6)-(15) . Section 5 ,1 
will demonstrate how this is done. 
The until data, then, is not compelling evidence for the existence 
of the syntactic rule. 
2 . 2 . Tag questions 
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2.2 . l. R. Lakoff (1969) discusses NEG-RAISING and tag questions. 
Tag questions are usually formed containing opposite polarity from 
the main sentence with respect to negativity, as in the following 
examples: 
(16) a. Joan is coming, isn't she? 
b. Joan isn't coming, is she7 
whereas tags with matching polarity are either 'ungrammatical or 
quite different in meaning, generally sarcastic'. 
(17) a. Joan bas left, has she? 
b. *Joan hasn't left, hasn't she? 
Tags are usually permitted only on the top sentence: 
(18) a. Yogi hopes the Mets will win, doesn't he? 
b. *Yogi hopes the Mets will win, won't they? 
But under certain cil'ctunstances, they are permitted on the complement 
sentence: 
(19) I suppose the Phillies won't win, will they? 
(20) *I suppose the Phillies won't win, don't I? 
(21) *I don't suppose the Phillies will win, do I? 
Lakoff says that the tag is formed from the lower sentence because 
suppose is being used as a perfonnative1 and for that reason, (20) 
and (21) are out, since performatives may not be questioned or negated. 
Now consider (22) and (23): 
(22} *I don't suppose the Phillies will win, won't they? 
(23) I don't suppose the Phillies will win, will they? 
In these sentences, suppose is used performativel..y, so the tag is 
formed from the embedded sentence. In (22), opposite polarity produces 
a bad sentence and (23) is acceptable, even though the tag matches in 
polarity and the performative seems to be negated. Lakoff claims that 
the not originated in the lower sentence and was moved by NEG-RAISING, 
so that when the tag is formed, the polarity will be opposite and the 
performative is not negated in deep structure. The apparent oddness 
of (2,3) is explained by deriving it from (19). 
2 . 2.2. Jackendoff (1971) has two objections to this account. The 
first is that the verbs suppose, guess, imagine, and suspect, which 
would work in the examples (19) and (23) do not undergo NEG-RAISING 
in the following examples. 
supposed}(24) Steve :imagined that the Phillies hadn't won. 
guessed 
suspected 
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(25) Steve didn't [::~~=]that the Phillies had won. 
guess 
suspect 
There are ma.ny speakers for whom the sentences in (25) are not para-
phrases of those in (24), so NEG- RAISING cannot be at work here (in a 
theory where transformations are meaning-preserving). 
Secondly, for most NEG-RAISING verbs, the model (19) and (23) is 
fine, but for think and believe, we get: 
(26) a . I don't think they'll win, will they? 
b . I don't believe they'll win, will they? 
These should have come from the very much worse (27) 
(27) a . *I think they won't win, will they? 
b.?*I believe they won't win, will they? 
Since NEG-RAISING is optional, these last two ought to be good, but for 
some rea.son, they aren't . 
These problems put a question on the whole tag-question argument, 
and they raise doubts as to whether tag questions are really that simple 
a matter at all. (See sections 3.2,4 and 5.2 for some discussion). 
Even if independent evidence shows that NEG-RAISING is indeed a trans-
formational rule, how can these examples be explained? 
2.3. Parentheticals 
2.3 .l. Ross (1973) notices that the class of verbs which can appear 
as final-position negative parentheticals is the same as the class 
that undergoes Nm-RAISING, as demonstrated in (28) 
(28) a . We're not in Lompoc yet, I don't think. 
b . *We haven't reached a conclusion, we didn't claim. 
Since, as Ross claims, negative 1)8.rentheticals, unlike positive ones, 
may only occur af'ter negative sentences as in {29), 
{29) a. *Harvey has eleven toes, I don't think. 
b. The fiscal year bad (not) been encouraging, they 
realized. 
Ross proposes that NEG-RAISING be split into two parts, NEG-COPYING-, 
while optionally copies a negative from an embedded sentence to the 
upper sentence whose main verb is think, guess, believe, etc . and NEG-
DELEI'ION which deletes the lower NEG when a copy has been made. 
2.J.2. There have been other cases in the literature where movement 
rules have been claimed to be really a copying rule plus a deletion 
rule (for example, Perlmutter 1972) . The question has been raised 
as to whether all movement rules might not be reanalyzed in this wey. 
If this were to be the case, then the constraints mentioned in Ross 
(1967) which apply to chopping rules would resJ.ly be constraints on 
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deletions . Neubauer (1970) claims that some deletion rules violate 
Ross ' s constraints, but bis examples are not compelling. In the case 
of Nm- DELETION, this wouJ.d never come up anyvay, since the original 
NEG-RAISING rule '11'8.S not an unbounded movement ruJ.e. 
There are still problems with the copy-plus-delete analysis, 
however. In general, the deletion rules would all have to mention 
the same environments as their partner copying rules and must 
obligatorily2 apply to delete the original constituent after it is 
copied. Thus NEG-DELEI'ION is obligatory, providing that the complement 
structure necessary for NEG-COPYING has not been disturbed by the 
intervening (in Ross ' s analysis) rule SLIFTING, which preposes the 
embedded sentence. That these same conditions should apply to all these 
deletion rules seems questionable. 
There is an additional problem for NEG-DELErION . Most of these 
deletion-of-a-copy rules will not find their structural descriptions 
met unless the copying ruJ.e has just applied . But Ross notes that 
sentences with two NEGs can exist without the copying rule. In these 
cases NEG-DELETION must not apply, even though its structural description 
is satisfied. Thus (30aJmust be prevented from becoming (30b) 
(30) a. I NEG believe Cwe NEG will have a recession.] 
b. I don't believe we will have a recession. 
This is the same problem encountered by NEG-ABSORPTION (see 
section 2 .1 .2), to which NEG-DELETION bears a strong resemblance. 
Jackendoff's (1972) discussion of an alternative treatment of 
parentheticals will be brought up in section 5 .3. 
2 . 4. The late rules 
2 . 4.1. Lindholm (1969) briefly mentions sentences like 
(31) I don 't think John loves Marsha anymore, but she 
doesn't realize it yet . 
The it preasumably refers to the clause John doesn' t l ove Marsha anymore 
and is inserted by a rule of SENTENCE-PRONOMINALIZATION . For this 
pronominalization-under-identity rule to have applied, the first part 
of (31) must have, at some point in the derivation, contained the phrase 
John doesn ' t love Marsha anymore in order for the identity to have 
obtained between it and the same phrase in the second conjunct. 
Afier SENTENCE-PRONOMINALIZATION applies, NEG-RAISING lifts the 
negative in the first conjunct. 
2.4 .2 . Observe the following phenomenon: 
(32) a . He ' s coming and I can guess yhy he's coming. 
b. He' s coming and I can guess why. 
Sentence (32b) comes from (3~a) by a rule, described in Ross (1969), 
called SWICING, which deletes all of the last clause except the 
question word (and a preposed preposition, optionally) when it is an 
en,bedded question and identical to another part of the sentence (or of 
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a previous sentence). The sentences in (33) show that the not of 
why...~ may also optionally be undeleted, although why not is 
obviously wrong where there was no original negative, as in (33d). 
(33) a. He 's not coming and I can guess why he's not 
coming. 
b. He's not coming and I can guess why . 
c. He's not coming and I can guess why not. 
d. *He's coming and I can guess why not . 
Sentence (34) shows that SWICING may also delete under identity with 
an embedded sentence. 
(34) I know he's not coming and I can guess why not. 
But now consider (35), where there is no surface not in the embedded 
sentence: 
(35) I don't think he's coming and I can guess why not. 
The why not is apparently a sluiced form of why he's not coming. This 
suggests that the first part of the sentence contained the phrase he's 
not coming at the point when SLUICING applied, otherwise there wouldn't 
be any identity to allow SWICING. 
Notice that in sentence (36), 
(36) Mary doesn't think he's coming and I can guess why 
not. 
refer to the main verb (i.e . SLUICING might have applied 
to I can ess wh Ma doesn't think that . . . ), but this reading doesn't 
make sense in {35, where the~ supposedly originates in the lower 
sentence and NEG-RAISING takes place after SLUICING. 
2 . 4.3. In the following sentences 
(37) a. ~e Phillies will win 8Jld the Mets won't vin either . 
b . The Phillie.s won't win and the Mets won't win either. 
c. The Phillies von't win and neither will the Mets. 
it is seen that for either to appear, there must be a negative (or an 
implied negative) in both clauses. And for neither to appear, in 
addition to negativity in both conjuncts, the VP parts of the conJuncts 
must be identical (cf. Klima 1964), since the rule of VP DELETION 
(defended in Ross 1969), which deleted a VP on identity to a VP in 
another conjunct, as in (38), 
(38) The Phillies will win and the Mets won't. 
would accompany the neither- fronting. Thus (37b) is an earlier form 
or (37c). Now consider (39) 
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(39) I don't think the Phillies will win and neither will 
the Mets. 
At the point in the derivation where the neither is to be fronted, the 
two conjunct1, must be identical and negative. A deeper structure for 
(39) might be (40) . 
(40) I think the Phillies won ' t win and the Mets won't 
win, too . 
This implies that too, which appears in positive conjunctions, changes 
to either in negative cases and that the change to a fronted neither 
includes VP DELETION (and its requisite identity of the conjuncts) at 
some point . Even if these details are not exactly right, the argument 
is the sa.~e . The~ must have originally been in the embedded 
sentence and NEG- RAISING applies after the conditions for neither 
are met . 
2 .5. The ordering paradox 
2 . 5.1. What the three rules discussed in section 2 . 4 have in common is 
the following: They all apply to conjoined structures, and the 
deletions or anaphora that occur as a result of their application all 
take place (optionally} under identity between the deleted material and 
some other part of the sentence . If there is no rule of NEG-RAISING, 
the 'identity' under which these deletions would occur must be modified. 
See section 2 . 5.4. for a discussion of this possibility . 
2.5.2 . Without a redefinition of 'identity', a previously unnoticed 
probl.em arises. La.koff (1970) claims that lHJG-RAISINO is cyclic, as 
seen with sentences of the type (41). 
(41) a . I think Cliff believes Susan doesn't love him. 
b. I think Cliff doesn't believe Susan loves him . 
c. I don't thinlt Cliff believes that Susan loves him. 
But consider the example sentences in section 2.4. The st,ructure of 
these sentences is (very generalized) like (42). 
( 42) 
.. .xi ... 
If NEG-RAISING is cyclic ai, suggested, it would apply on the S1 and 
S2 cycles before the S3 cycle . However, the examples in section 2 . 4 
show that NEG-RAISING must follow the three rules, all of which Yould 
not apply until. the S3 cycle is begun and all 61 and S2 cycle X'Ules 
have fini shed. For example in sentence (35), the structure would, be 
( 43). 
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(43) 
be is not coming why be is not coming 
If !UX;-RAISING is cyclic, it should apply on the s4 cycle and SLUICING 
should apply on the S5 cycle. But ·we have seen that NID- RAISillG must 
follow SWICING on the s5 cycle. 
2 . 5 . 3 . Having NEG-RAISING apply on the S5 cycle means one of two 
things: (i) NEG-RAISING is not following the principle of strict 
cyclicity (cf. Chomsky 1973), which states essentially that 'rules 
cannot in effect return to earlier stages of the cycle after the 
derivation has moved to larger, more inclusive dome.ins ' (p. 243); or 
(ii) NEG-RAISING is a post-cyclic rule, which means that it need not 
follow the strict cyclicity principle . 
2. 5. 3.1. But there are problems with both of these alternatives . Even 
though the sentences in (41) are consistent with a post-cyclic !UX,-
RAISING rule. (ii) cannot be the case for the following reasons. 
Consider the following pairs of sentences: 
(44) a. Jloth Mutt and Jeff think that this theory 'IIOn ' t 
last until Thursday . 
b. Both Mutt and Jeff don't think that this theory 
will last until Thursday. 
c. Ueither Mutt nor Jeff thinks that they theory will 
last until Thursday. 
In the derivation (44a) to (44b) to (4lic) NEG- RAISING must precede the 
rule that incorporates the Nro into the both.. .and to give neither •.. 
.!!£!:.• However in ( 4 5), 
(45) a . I think that both Mutt and Jeff will not give LSA 
papers this year . 
b. I think that neither Mutt nor Jeff will give LSA 
papers this year. 
c. I don't think that either Mutt or Jeff will give 
LSA papers this year. 
d. I dcm 't think that both Mutt and Jeff will give LSA 
papers this year. 
the rule incorporating the NB, must precede 1fEG-RAIS1NG in order to get 
from (45a) to (45b) to (45c). If NEG-RAISING applied first to (45a}, 
then (45d), which is not synooymous to it, would result . 
The fact that two rules !Dllst apply in both orders is the usual 
argument for the cyclicity of' the rules. 
Also consider the fact that in (41), if IIBG- RAISING works post-
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cyclically, tben it should111ove the negative in an all- at- once movement. 
But for the rule to work at all, the correct lexical items must be 
present in all the correct places. This would mean that the rule was 
subject to a Boolean combination of the lexical items which allow it to 
operate. This type of rule government has been disfavored, even by its ori-
ginal proponent (G. Lakoff 1970b, Preface) in favor of global constraints. 
Thus, a post-cyclic NEG-RAISING rule would have to be much more 
complicated in order to be able to iterate. Therefore, NEG-RAISING is 
cyclic. 
2 . 5.3.2. If it is cyclic , we can first of all consider the possibility 
of its being highest-trigger cyclic. This runs into the same problem 
just given above: it must iterate. 
It might be claimed that NEC~RAISING could be both highest-trigger 
cyclic and iterative, i . e ., that it moved the negative up one sentence 
at a time (checking for the appropriate environment on each cycle), but 
that it only applied on the trigger cycle and repeated itself until it 
reached the trigger cycle . 
But this means that the rule would be applying to a clause sub-
ordinate to the main clause of that cycle. Jackendoff (1972: ch. 9) 
goes through some examples of the following type to show what would 
happen if rules could iterate like this. 
Suppose we have a sentence like (46) 
(46) Anita said that Ruth passed the pipe to Bonnie. 
On the first cycle, PASSIVE applies giving (47). 
(47) Anita said that the pipe was passed to Bonnie by Ruth, 
On the following cycle, PASSIVE's structural description is met 
again. A NP may often be passivized from a PP directly following the 
verb as in The bed was slept in by Kilroy. If PASSIVE applies again, 
the result is (48) 
(48} *Anita said that Bonnie was been passed to by the 
pipe by Ruth. 
which is obviously an ungrammatical sentence, So there are good 
reasons why transformations must not be allowed to iterate . This is 
the motivation behind the strict cyclicity principle. 
If the NEG- RAISING rule is successive cyclic, having it follow 
SWICING in (35) also violates the strict cyclic~ty principle. Also 
in this case, there is the problem of how to prevent NEG-RAISING from 
applying on the S4 cycle, which comes first. If the claim is made 
that SLUICING, VP DELETION or SENTENCE PRONOMINALIZATION are post-
cyclic, then an ordering paradox exists. Notice that having non-
extrinsically ordered rules will not help here, since even most people 
who do not accept ordered rules accept the notion of the cycle--and 
a cyclic rule which must follow a post-cyclic (or at least higher-
cyclic) rule will still produce a paradox. 
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Faced vith these obstacles, the c-0ndition on identity must be 
changed. 
2 . 5.4. If we can redefine the ' identity' under which the anaphora 
rules work, then we can allow NEG-RAISING to apply first and then let 
the rules apply under our newly defined identity. This has been 
proposed by Grinder and Postal (1971), where they say 'grammars must 
allow certain transformations to apply at one point in a derivation to 
some phrase marker PMi, subject to a s.emantic identity condition statable 
only at a different stage of the derivation on the phrase marker PMj , 
where PMi and PMJ are non- contiguous . The link between these two stages 
is the notion of corresoond.ing constituent ...and has been described... 
as a Global Derivational Constraint' . 
Specifically in this case, the identity condition on SWlCING and 
the others will be something like (49) . 
{49) Two conjuncts which dii'fer only in that the first bas 
had a negative raised out of i ·c by an application oi' 
NEG-RAISING while t™! second conjunct retains the 
negative will be considered identical for the purpose 
of the rule . 3 
So, NID-RAISING will be cyclic and precede all of these rules, but will 
not affect the identity under which the anaphora is created. 
Compared with some of the derivational constraints that have 
appeared in the literature, {49) is not that unusual {assuming that the 
modifications mentioned in footnote 3 and aey others that might be 
discovered can be implemented without too much trouble), but then there 
will be no say to prevent sentence (50). 
{50) *Bill didn't believe that John would come until tomorrow 
and I believed it, too. 
G. La.koff (1970a: footnote 5) specifically deals with this sentence and 
says that it is prevented by the fact that SENTENCE-PRONOMINALIZATION 
may not occur 1.n this case because the two conjuncts are not identical . 
NEG-RAISillG has applied in the first but not the second, so there is a 
not in the second conjunct not present in the first. But this is just 
the condition described in {49). In order :for sentence (31) to be 
generated, condition (49) is necessary. So the condition must be 
modified somehow to exclude (50). There may be a way to do this, but 
it vould most likely complicate the condition to the point where it 
looks much more unwieldy and ad hoc than before. 
2.5.5 . To sum up this section, proponents of a NEG~RAISING trans-
formation are faced with either an ordering paradox or a fairly 
complicated global condition on identity for the anaphora rules . 
2 . 6. Summary 
In this section, I have presented the published syntactic arguments 
for the rule of NEG-RAISING and the problems they create. None of the 
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arguments is free of troubles, which makes the rule highly suspect, 
based on the existing syntactic evidence. In addition, the ordering 
paradox or its alternative is a serious complication the analysis must 
face . 
After I have attempted to formulate the process as a semantic 
interpretation rule, I shall return in section 5 to each of the sets 
of data mentioned here to see how they would be handled in the Inter-
pretive Semantics framework I am using. It will be seen that in some 
cases, the interpretive rules have fewer troubles, although in other 
cases there are the same problems as in the (largely} Generative 
Semantics approach used so far. 
3 . The Semantic and Illocutionary Problems Involved. 
3.1. Predicates which allow NEG- RAISmG 
3 .1.l . It is well known that Nm-RAISING cannot apply in every sentence 
with a complement clause. The specific predicates which allow it are few 
in number. G. La.koff (1970b} rerers to NEG-RAISING as a minor rule. 
The predicates which undergo the rule fall into three separate syntactic 
classes: 
(51) think, believe, supposg, expect , imagine, guess, 
suspect, reckon, see, anticipate, predict?, 
fancy?, figure? 
(52) want, plan on, intend, wish, feel like, choose, 
contemplate, be supposed to, mean?5 . 
(53} seem, appear, be likely, be probable?, look like, 
figure to . 
3.1 . 2 . The question has been rai sed whether these predicates form 
natural sems.ntic classes or disjunction,; of classes . G. Lakoff (1970a} 
claims that they don't, due to the fact that some people don't have all 
of these as NEG-RAISING verbs. He also says that if there were semantic 
classes, they would be cross-language classes. Since hoffen in German 
is a NEG-RAISING verb, while hope in English isn't, this falsifies the 
claim that there is a semantic class, Lakoff says . Therefore the rule 
is governed by predicates marked for it, whether it is a syntactic or 
6semantic rule . 
Nevertbeless, simply marking the individual verbs as undergoing 
the rule or not is a very arbitrary method and makes the claim that 
these predicates are all learned as exceptions to the usual case (i.e . , 
NEG-RAISING is not allowed} . Irttuitively this seems to be wrong. It 
would be very convenient to say-that one can predict from the meaning 
of a verb whether or not it vill allow NEG-RAISING. 
Some things can already be said about the types of predicates that 
are or are noc in these classes. Kiparslcy' and Kiparsky (1970} note 
that factive verbs may not undergo NEG-RAISING . G. Lakoff" (1970a} 
attempts to explain this with an idea from Dwight Bolinger that the 
farther away the negative is moved from the verb it negates, the more 
uncertainty there is cortcerning the assertion. For example, ( 54a} 
and (54b): 
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(54) a. Susan thought Marilyn he.dn 't left. 
b. Susan didn't think Marilyn had le:rt . 
For a factive, there is a presupposition that the complement is 
true, so the subject of the sentence could not be uncertain about it. 
Horn (1971) suggests this be extended to include implicative verbs (cf, 
Karttunen 1971). Thus, the substitution of realize in (54a} and (54b)
results in non-synonymy. 
These explanations seem reasonable in the absence of anything 
better, so it seems quite more likely that the classes of NEG- RAISING 
verbs are natural classes. Individual speakers may allow or disallow 
some members of the classes, but those are just individual variations. 
As a result, the fact that someone might not have NEG-RAISING for 
anticipate is an accident; the fact that they don't have it for realize 
or even claim is not an accident. 
3.1 .3. In conjunction with Bolinger's comment above, Lakoff mentions 
that there is nothing in the theory which predicts that the more certain 
assertion is when the negation is nearer the verb it negates. It could 
Just as easily be the other way around. It has been suggested to me 
(Arnold Zvicky, personal communication) that there may be a perceptual 
factor involved, in that it might be harder to associate a negative with 
a verb ir they are separated. This would claim that the farther away 
the negative moves, the less the certainty of the assertion , which is 
what happens. 
If it is not a perceptual matter, then the fact remains that (54a} 
and (54b) are not exactly synonymous. In a theory vbere transformations 
preserve meaning, this lack of synonymy implies different deep structures. 
Therefore for sentences like (54b} the rule is obligatory and sensitive 
to some semantic information. Lakoi'f, who notices this problem, makes 
no suggestions as to what information the rule should be sensitive to 
and I don't see either bow to mark a sentence as undergoing NEG-RAISING 
(without resorting to an ad hoc feature which is only present for Nm-
RAISING verbs}. Neither do I have any way of indicating in an Inter-
pretive Semantics framework hov strong a negative is. This makes 
Zwicky's solution more pleasing, in that it is compatible with either 
framework. 
When better accounts of actual meanings of words are given, this 
may enable a more general statement of what kinds of verbs allow NEG-
RAISING to be made. Until then, there are only vague ideas as to the 
characteristics of the semantic classes involved. See Horn (l975} for 
some additional discussion. 
3.2. Illocutionary ractors . 
3.2.l, Lindholm (l969) notices that the verb believe, normally a NEG-
RAISING verb, does not undergo the rule in some of its uses. He 
distinguishes two senses, believe it and believe so and notes that NEG-
RAISING only applies to believe so, as in (55), 
(55) a. Bill believes that Betty won' t come and I don't 
believe so , either. 
b. *Bill believes that Betty won't come and I don't 
believe it either. 
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He tries to set up two different underlying predicates for the two 
senses of believe, one being have the opinion that S, the other being 
accept the claim that S. Only the have the opinion predicate would be 
marked for NEG-RAISING. 
3.2 . 2 . Kimball (1970) puts this observation into a much larger 
perspective. He distinguishes two types of utterances, expressive and 
reportive. Roughly, expressives are expressions of states of mind, 
reportives are assertions. Some examples will help to illustrate. 
The sentence 'It hurts' can be used as an expression of pain, 
much like a groan .might. On the other hand, the same sentence can be 
used to assert that pain is felt. In the expressive sense (the first 
case), it does not deal with the truth value of any proposition . In 
the second case, the reportive sense, the sentence could be used as an 
ans,.,er to a question, ' Does it hurt?'. In other "ords, it is asserting 
the truth or falsity of a proposition. 
For another example, take sentence (56) . 
(56) I think this milk is spoiled. 
Sentence (56) can be uttered as the response to t"o different questions 
(57a) and (57b) . 
(57) a. How ' s the milk doing? 
b. What do you think about the milk? 
As the answer to (57a), (56) makes a medged assertion about the 
mill, so it i s expressive. As the ans,.,er to (57b) , (56) is an assertion 
about what the speaker thinks, hence it is reportive. Notice that (56) 
can be answered in two ways each responding to one of the senses. 
(58) a. Well , it isn't; we just got it. (response to 
expressiveJ 
b. No, you don't; you just told Mary that it is 
fine . (response to reportiveJ 
It can be seen that as an expressive (56) makes an assertion about 
the milk; as a reportive, it makes an assertion about the speaker ' s 
having a belief towards some proposition. 
Since an expressive I believe. •. makes no assertion about the 
speaker, it cannot be questioned or negated. Theymay1nake expressive 
sentences seem like performative sentences (Austin i962), Performatives 
must occur in present tense and in first person. But the folloving 
examples show that expressives may appear in past tense or in other 
persons. 
(59) a. Jerry believes there will be a recession. 
b. I thought we could keep our clothes on for this. 
The answers to these sentences in their expressive and reportive senses, 
respectively, would be (60a) and (60b). 
(60) a. No, there -won't; no we can't. 
b. No, he doesn 't; no you didn ' t. 
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So expressives are not as restricted as performatives . 
This expressive-reportive distinction conditions the choice of 
the pronoun so or it, as in (61a) and (61b} 
(61) a. He says Nixon bas resigned, but I don't believe 
it . CreportiveJ 
b. He says Nixon bas resigned, but I don't believe 
so. [expressive] 
3.2.3. Kimball claims that only expressive sentences may undergo NEG-
RAISI.NG. This would explain Lindholm's facts about believe so vs. 
believe it. Furthermore, Kimball says that the expressive quality cannot 
reside in the individual lexical items themselves, but must be a quality 
of the whole sentence. If this were not so, then each of the NEG-RAISING 
verbs would have to be marked as ambiguous, with only one of the 
meanings allowing NEG-RAISING. If an important generalization is not 
to be lost, we must say that all of these expressive verbs must have 
some semantic characteristics in common. 
Herein lies the problem. How is the expressive character of a 
sentence to be represented formally? This point will be taken up again 
shortly. 
3.2 .4. The expressive-reportive classification is capable of explaining 
several other phenomena. 
As is well known, all English modal verbs have two meanings, root 
and espitemic. For instance may: 
(62) He may eat his dinner. [root meaning= permission] 
[epistemic meaning= possibility] 
Most of the modals (can, UJUSt, might, will, should, etc. ) , 1.1sed 
epistemically, denote some kind of possibility or probability; thus the 
sentences they are in have some kind of truth value. Therefore they 
must be reportive. So, no expressive sentence may contain an e~ist emic 
model. 
Furthenoore, since the predicates used in sentences with NEG-
RAISING aTe stative, they cannot take root medals, either. This means 
that the presence of any modal verb in a sentence will block NEG-RAISING . 
And this is so; compare (63) with (6h) and (65) 
(63) a. She believes that he doesn't cheat on her. 
b. = She doesn't believe that he cheats on her. 
(64) a . She can believe that he doesn't cheat on her . 
b. # She cannot believe that be cheats on her. 
(65) a. She may believe that he doesn't cheat on her . 
b. ,' She may not beli eve that he cheats on her. 
It also seems that expressiveness may have something to do in tag 
questions. R. Lakoff (1969) claims that the ungrammaticality of 
sentence (66) is due to the fact that suppose is being used as a 
performative and performa't:,i ves may not be questioned (or tag- questioned). 
(66) *I suppose the P"nillies will win the pennant, don't I? 
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She claims that in these performative cases, and onzy in these, the tag 
is formed from the complement sentence, viz. (67) . 
(67) I suppose the Phillies won't win, will they? 
She generalizes this to all normal cases, in which she claims the 
tags are formed one sentence dovn from an abstract performative. Her 
explanation for why (68) has the tag formed after NEG-RAISING, 
(68) Steve doesn't suppose the Phillies will win, does he? 
whereas from (67) the tag-fonnation precedes NEG- RAISING, is that both 
tag- formation and NE'..-RAISING are cyclic rules and in (67) and (68) tag-
formation is applying on different cycles. 
But Kimball shows that tag-questions cannot be based on performa-
tives, using sentences like (69). 
(69) a. 1 imagine they'll vin, won't they? 
b. I think they ' ll win, won't they? 
c . I believe they'll win, won't they? 
where think , imagine and believe cannot be considered as performatives . 
These sentences, while not performative, are e.xpressive. It 
seems that the tag is formed on the sentence tbatis asserted. In (68) 
the main clause is asserted, so the tag is based on it; and in (67) the 
complement is asserted, so the tag is based on the complement . 
Hooper (1974} discusses the cases where tags may be formed on a 
complement clause. She distinguishes classes of verbs which allow this ; 
the classes of hers which are of interest are the weak assertive verbs 
and the semi- factive verbs. The weak assertives are the group listed 
above in (51) as NEG-RAISING verbs. The semi-factives, which do not 
allow NEG- RAISING, are shown in (70) and (71). 
(70) know, notice, see, observe, realize, recall, etc. 
(71) a. I know you've been at the cookies again, haven't 
you? 
b. I notice the refrigerator is leaking, isn't it? 
c . I realize he's just eaten 42 eggs, hasn ' t he? 
d. I recall she was a lumberjack then, wasn't she? 
Hooper (13) adds the condition for complement tags that it must be a 
'speaker assertion'. All of the sentences in (71) will be bad if!. is 
replaced by Harry or if the main clause is put into past tense . In 
addition, some other members of the semi-factive class, discover and 
find out, do not allow complement tags because they cannot be used in 
first person present assertions . This is the case as with the NEG-RAISING 
verbs. Notice that the sentences in (72) are bad. 
(72) a. *Steve doesn't suppose the Phillies will win, will 
they? 
b. *I believed the Flyers were vinning, weren't they? 
What this suggests is the semi- factives, like the NID-RAISING verbs, may 
be used in both expressive and r eportive sentences. Hooper's assertive/ 
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non- assertive distinctions are important, but they crosscut the 
expressive/reportive distinction rather than replace it . Complement 
tags can be formed only in expressive sentences which contain these 
two classes of verbs, the semi-factives being of no further i nterest to 
us here . 
The foregoing answers one of Jackendoff's complaints to the tag 
argument given in section 2. He claimed that verbs like suppose, guess 
and others, which allow NEG-RAISING in frames like (67) , do not allow 
NEG-RAISING (for many speakers) in sentences like (73). 
(73) a . Steve didn't guess that the Phillies would win . 
b. Steve guessed that the Phillies wouldn't win . 
Obviously, for people who feel that (73a) and (73b) are not 
synonymous, guess is not being used expressively there. If it were, then 
!lEX;- RAISING would be allowed and the sentences would mean the same thing. 
For some speakers, (73a) and (73b) do share a reading, and in that case, 
guess is being used expressively. 
I also claim that the anaphora rules discussed in section 2.4 are 
sensitive to the expressive-reportive distinction . Compare (74a) and 
(74b): 
(74) a. I believe she is coming and I can guess why. 
b. Barbara regrets she is coming and I can guess why. 
In (74a), the why has the preferred reading whl she is coming , although 
the reading why I believe . .. is possible . In 74b) the reading~ 
Barbara regrets ... is strongly preferred to why she is coming. This 
seems to parallel the tag-question case somewhat. In the preferably 
expressive (74a), the complement is what is asserted, so it is more 
likely to be what the sluiced clause refers to. (74b) must be 
reportive, and the sluiced clause refers again to what is asserted, 
the main clause. Note that the possible reading of (74a) as why I 
believe... exists because I believe may also be reportive . I would 
claim therefore, that the anaphora rules may use embedded clauses as 
antecedents only in cases where the clause is vhat is asserted. The 
number of verbs which allow this is larger than the number which allow 
complement tags (see Hooper and Thompson (1973) for more discussion) , but 
it is possible only when the verbs are being used in an expressive 
sentence. So it seems like the bifurcation of sentences into expressive 
and reportive may have effects in several areas of the grammar. 
3 . 2.5. By saying that only expressive sentences undergo NEG-RAISING, 
predictions are made about the sense of some sentences . Thus, if a 
sentence with a NEG-RAISiliG verb fails to undergo NEG-RAISING, the 
prediction is that the sentence is not an expressive one. Likewise, if 
a sentence fails to allow a tag on the complement clause, the claims 
is that it is not an ex:presive sentence. We will see examples like this 
in section 5 . 
Some interesting facts discovered by Clinkenbeard (1969) need 
explaining. The following sentence with believe has undergone PASSIVE 
and is not ambiguous . 
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(75) That Hildy is coming is not believed by Joel . 
Kiparsky and Kiparsky (1970) explain sentences like this by the fact 
that the complement sentence is in subject positi on and in this position 
it tends more towards being presupposed. This must mean that (75) is 
reportive, which explains the non-ambiguity, since NEG-RAISING could 
not have applied. 
However, if EXTRAPOSITION applies, the complement is no longer 
presupposed and the sentence may be expressive (i.e., NW-RAISING may 
apply). RAISING may also be appl i cable . Notice the sentences in (76) . 
(76) a. It is not believed by Joel that Hildy is coming. 
b. Hildy is not believed by Joel to be coming. 
The predicates seem and appear cannot be used reportively, so their 
complements must be asserted. Therefore subject complements with are 
not allowed (cf. (77)) . 
(77) e. *That .IJJny is not home seems. 
b. *That Izzy has closed t he stor e appears . 
These sentences are acceptable if EXTRAPOSITION and RAISING have applied. 
Just why the subject complement sentences may not be expressive is 
not clear to me. Hooper (1974) has some discussion of this, but the 
matter is far from settled. See also secti on 4 . 3 . 4. for more on some 
of these sentences. 
3 . 3 . Formalization 
As mentioned earlier, there is little i n the way of formalization 
i'or the dif'ference between expressive and reportive sentences. Kimball 
mentions some mechanisms in a Generative Semanti.cs f'ra.mework that won't 
word. In particular, the theory of exceptions is unequipped to 
distinguish between expressive and reportive believe by means of a 
mark on the lexical item. This solution again suggests that it is a 
completely arbitrary choice of verbs which would be so marked and it 
makes no claims about the semantic nature of t he verbs ; it would just 
be a change that believe as opposed to realize bas two lexical entries , 
one of which is marked for NEG- RAISING. 
Kimball says that the class of NEG-RAISING verbs is semantically 
defined as the class which may be used expressively. We have seen that 
the class which may be used expressively is larger than that. The 
semantic classes of Hooper and Thompson do not solve the problem, but 
just give it a new name, although they do show that a semantic answer 
is probably the right one, contra Lakoi'f. There is still no mechanism 
in the theory which will allow one to predict a verb's behavior with 
respect to NEG-RAISING from its semantic content . 
It is not obvious to me how this could be done in the Interpretive 
Semantics system described in the next section, either . A few ideas 
will be suggested in section 4.2.6. In the meantime, I will merely 
refer to an expressive sentence without actuall y indi cating a formalism, 
in the absence of a good one . I would hope that this inexplicitness 
has no significance for the rest of the discussion, and will not affect 
any of the results I obtain. 
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4. An AJ.ternative Approach. 
In this section I will describe the general theoretical fram.ework 
within which I am working towards a description of the data, The grammar 
I am using is basically that described in Jackendoff (1972). I will 
provide a brief sketch of it, with special emphasis to the modal 
structure, which is the part concerned with negation in general . I will 
then attempt to formulate a semantic interpretation rule which I call 
NEG-ASSOCIATION to replace NEG-RAISING. The question of how this rule 
contributes to the semantic representation of a sentence will be more 
f'u.U.y discussed in section 5. 
4.1. Interpretive Semantics7 
4.1.1. In the first works on generative grammar, the derivation of the 
meaning of a sentence from its syntactic structure was not dealt with. 
It was not until Katz and Fodor (1963) that generative grammarians began 
to look at the problem of how to relate meaning and form . Katz and Fodor 
developed the idea of projection rules which contribute to the semantic 
representation of a sentence, that part which is not traceable to the 
lexical items themselves, but instead arises from how they are combined 
syntactically. Each phrase structure rule and transformation would have 
with it an associated projection rule which would explain how the 
syntactic rule affects the meaning of a sentence which uses it in its 
derivation. 
Katz and Postal (1964) attempted to show that none of the trans-
formations change the meaning of the sentence, hence they need not have 
any projection rules associated with them. From this, they proposed 
that all necessary semantic information was present in the deep structure . 
The logical result of extending this :Proposal is to claim that 
there is no level of deep structure separate from the semantic repre-
sentation, and that the base rules actually generate the semantic 
structure of the sentence . This claim has been ma.de (at least implicitly) 
in several places (e.g. G. Lakoff 1971, Mccawley 1968) in some form or 
other. This was tbe i"ra.mework adopted in section 2 of this paper . 
On the other hand, if it could be shown that the semantic repre-
sentation of a sentence must be determined from more than one level of 
representation, then the deep structure would not contribute the entire 
meaning. There could be semantic interpretation rules operating on the 
surface struct=e (or some other level) to add to the meaning of a 
sentence. Tbi.s is the approach taken by Chomsky (1971) and Jackendoff 
(1972) among others. Jackendoff , in particular, has a fail·l.y complex 
idea of semantic representation, for which he develops several kinds of 
semantic interpretation rules (described below). 
The overall intent of this type of framework is to show 'that if 
rules of sernantic interpretation can be formulated properly, their 
p1·operties and the properties of the semantic representations they 
derive can be us.ed to account for [manyJ se111Sntic phenomena, leaving 
the syntactic component as free of semantic intervention as it was in 
Syntactic Structures'(Jackendoff 1972: Preface). 
4.1.2. Jackendoff mentions four aspects of se111AI1tic interpretation, 
which, while related in some ways, are reasonably independent of each
8other. 
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First is the functional structure, which is read from the deep 
structure of the sentence . Each verb can be considered a semantic 
function with various noun phrases as arguments . The lexical entries 
for verbs will have them broken down into subfunctions like CAUSE or 
BECOME or directional functions. The projection rules will insert the 
NP ' s as arguments into the functions and generate a functional structure 
for a sentence. A system of 'thematic relations ' developed in Gruber 
(1965) is utilized to explain various syntactic and semantic phenomena 
in a more satisfying manner than can be done wi th t r adit ional grammat i cal 
r el at i ons alone or vith case relations a la Fi llmore (1968) . 
Another element of the representation is coreference relations 
among noun phrases in t he sentences . A table of coreference is set up , 
containing an entry for each pair of NP's in the sentence with the mark 
' coreferential ' or 'noncoreferential'. This information is claimed to 
be of a different nature from the functional structure , so it is 
represented as a separate part of the semantic representation. 
Another contributor to meaning is focus and presupposition, where 
focus and presupposition can very loosely be characterized as the new 
information and the old information a sentence contains . If a sentence 
receives a different focus by way of contrastive stress , the func tional 
structure is still the same . Focus and presupposit i on can be largely 
read from the surface structure. 
The fourth element of semantic representation is the modal 
structure, which is another hierarchical structure. This is the structure 
that explains ' the conditions under which a sentence purports t o correspond 
to s i tuations i n the real world' (Jackendoff (1972: 3). This element 
of semantic interpretation will be discussed in greater detail below. 
Once these separate elements have been assembled for a sentence, 
there has to be a way to determine whether there is a meaning that can 
be dr awn from them. This is done by means of well- formedness conditions 
on semantic interpretation, which specify which sentences do not have 
sensical meanings. One such example is selectional restr ictions, which 
are applied only after the entire reading has been formed. 
It is at this point where the shading between linguistic and extra-
l i ngui st ic knowl edge takes place . So (78) is out because of linguistic 
knowledge (or is it?), but (79) is reJected onl y on the basis of a 
mathematical theorem. 
(78) Yesterday I discovered an odd integer divisible by two. 
(79) Yesterday I discovered the highest prime number . 
In this area there are obviously many details to be worked out 
(such as the formal nature of selectional restrictions, for instance) but 
these are difficult problems in anybody ' s theory and they are beyond the 
scope of this study. 
Since selectional restrictions are assigned t o semantic r epre-
sentati ons, the process of lexical insertion is simplified. Complex 
symbols expressing the selectional restrictions, as used in Chomsky (1965), 
are not necessary. Lexical insertion will be free under category symbols. 
Another obvious well-formedness condi tion is t hat if two noun 
phr ases are marked coreferential they must be able to represent the same 
individual; hence (80) is unacceptable. 
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(80) *My mother respects himself. 
The only possible referent for himself is my mother but since the 
two NP's have different genders they cannot be coreferential , so (80) 
violates this well-formedness condition and is rejected. 
There are several other well-fonnedness conditions on semantic 
representations. These allow the transformations and the semantic 
interpretation rules to operate without complex conditions on their 
application, since the sentences with anomalous readings can be weeded 
out at the end of the derivation. 
4.1.3. Basically the syntactic component is the same as Chomsky (1965) 
with the difference in lexical insertion noted above. Jackendoff assumes 
an extended version of Chomsky's (1970) Lexicalist l{y-pothesis . Node 
labels are represented as being composed of distinctive features. 
Transformations may not change node labels or perform derivational 
morphology. This Lexicalist position excludes lexical decomposition 
(see section 2.1 .3), Derivational morphology is handled by redundancy 
rules in the lexicon (cf. Jackendoff 1975b}. 
Jackendoff also claims that the best solutions to a problem should 
increase the information content of the lexicon as little as possible . 
He eschews the use of exception features where a difference in syntactic 
behavior is related to the meaning of the items in question, since in 
that case , the rule need only refer to the meaning of the item to see 
how it behaves. 
This is hard to formalize, since meanings are not really at a 
sufficiently clear stage of expreS13ion. Jackendoff (24) says, 'it 
seems perfectly adequate to provisionally adopt an arbitrary feature, 
if we have clear intuitions about when this feature is present, and if 
it is fUlly understood that it has no life independent of the complete 
reading in which it is embedded.' 
This "Will be done in our discussion of medals and NEG-ASSOCIATION 
verbs below. While (at this level of formalization} it seems no less 
arbitrary than exception features, it is claimed, at least, that the 
items so marked are not learned as exceptions to rules, but that their 
syntactic and semantic behaviors will be readily predictable from their 
meanings when a truly adequate formulation of meaning is given. 
Ii. 2. Modal Structure 
4 . 2.1. In sentence (81) there are two pcssible readings. 
(81) Todd is looking for a groupie . 
On one reading, there is a specific groupie Todd is looking for; on the 
other, he will take any old groupie. In other words, a groupie may be 
either specific or nonspecific . There is a similar ambiguity in 
sentences with the following verbs. 
(82) look for, want, intend, ask for, hunt for , hope for, etc, 
Normally noun phrases are interpreted as specific. In sentences with 
one of the verbs in (82) in them, certain no·m prrases have the option 
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of being read as nonspecific. Jackendoff uses the following termino-
logy (which I adopt here). A verb in this class may introduce the 
possibilities of nonspecifity on noun phrases within a certain portion 
of the sentence. 'l'his portion of the sentence is called the scope of 
the verb (with regard to spE.>cificity) . Thus, a given no•m phrase in a 
given sentence is in a verb's scope if nonspecifity is a possibility. 
The NP is within the scope even if it is interpreted as specific . If 
it is specific, the liP is said to be not dependent on the verb; if the 
NP is non- specific, it is dependent on the verb. The scope of a verb 
is invariant through all readings. 
The verbs in (82) contain in their lE.'xical entries a modal 
operator called UliREALIZED . The modal condition on UNREALIZED says 
that a noun phrase which is dependent on UNREALIZED will have a specific 
rE.'ferent only when the unrealized situation comes to happen . For 
example, in the nonspecific reading (81) , ,here will be a specific 
groupie to point to only when Todd finds one ((81) would he broken 
down in functional structure as TRY (TODD.FIND (TODD, GROUPIE)). Each 
modal operator has its own modal condition. 
4.2.2. Ther e needs to be a rule vhich will determine vhich noun phrases 
are dependent on "hich modal operators . This is the rule (from 
Jackendoff 1972: 292): 
(83) (Modal ProJE.'ction rule) 
Given a lexical item A, vhose semantic representation 
contains a modal operator M, if a NP js within the 
scope of A, it is optionally (with degree of 
prefE.'rence dM) dependent on Min the modal structure, 
that is. sub,!ect to CM . If a r/P is outside the scope 
of M, it is not dependent on M. 
Several things need to be explained here . The first is the degree 
of preference rlM• The optionality of the dependence of a noun phrase 
on a modal operator varies sometimes from modal to modal or from speaker 
to speakE.'r . The dM is a fudge factor to handle this variation, in the 
absence of a more detailed account. 
The CM is the modal condition associated with the modal operator. 
For the operator UNREALIZED, we sav above that the condition stateo that 
a NP dependent on it vill have a referent vhen the unrealized situation 
comes about. Other modal operators vill have different conditions, as 
Ile will see. 
Some other modal operators, samples of lexical itel!JS bearing them 
and their modal conditions are given below: 
(8h) a. 
b. 
(85) a. 
b. 
{86) a. 
b. 
FUTURE: will 
CFUTURE' a TIP is claimE.'d to bavE.' a referent 
sometime in the future 
POSSIBLE: ~ossible, likely, may 
CPOSSIBLE' the existence of a referent is possible 
(stren,;:.;h varies with lexical item) 
~"EGA~IVE: no, not. never, neither, nothing, doubt, 
seldom, afraid, too . dissuade , etc. 
CNEGATIVE' there is no identifiable referent 
I 
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(87) a . MULTIPLE: some , all , each, ~ ' ~ . three , etc. 
b . CMlJLTI PLE' there is a distinct referent corresponding 
t o each member of the set being quantified. 
c. Five of the boys told me a story. (not dependent: 
(88) a . 
one story; dependent: 
WH: !!!!.- (questions) 
five stories) 
b. CWH:: the identification of a referent depends on 
tlle answer to the question. 
Notice that some of the operators have a degree of preference that 
leans towards obligatory application of the modal condition, for example 
NEGATIVE. In (89) it is hard to get the specific reading for a cigarette . 
(89) Libby couldn't find a cigarette . 
But with contrastive stress a specific reading is possible. Compare 
(90a) and (90b) . 
(90) a . I didn ' t see many of the celebrities there . 
0 . I didn't see many of the celebrities there . 
For an ambiguous sentence like (81), the two readings will have 
identical functional structures but will differ in modal structures. 
Jackendoff uses parentheses to indicate dependence. Hence the t wo 
readings of (81) will have modal structures like (91a ) and (91b) 
(91) a. UHREALIZED (a groupie) [non-specific J 
b. UNREALIZED ( ) CspecificJ 
\/'ill omit HF ' s that are not dependent on any modals. 
4.2 .3 . Modals can also affect clauses. For instance: 
(92) a. Todd wants to meet a gi·oupic. 
b . Todd will meet a grpupie. 
c . It is possible that Todd will meet a groupie. 
d. Todd doesn't have a wife . 
e. Four of "the band members met a groupie. 
In each of these sentences, the trutb conditions on the clauses in the 
scope of the modals are also subject to the modal condition. In (92a) 
Todd meets a groupie is true if the unrealized situasion comes about . 
(92b) claims that Todd meets a groupie will be true in the future . 
(92c) says that it is possible . (92d) says that the truth conditions 
for Todd bas a wife are not met . (92e) says thaL there could either 
have been one meeting or four meetings . 
Note that while the modal condJ tions for NP ' s are usuall y optional , 
the conditions for S's are usually obligatory. (Jackendoff 1972 discusses 
this (p. 312-314) to an extent. The question is beyond this paper.) 
4 . 2 . 4. Still to be discussed is the notion of the scope of a modal. 
The scope of a modal operator is ' that portion of the sensence within 
which the modal operator' may affect claims about the iden"tifiability 
of referents ' (Jackendoff 1972: 292). 
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In order for the rule to vork, it must have a knowl edge of which 
NP ' s (and S' s) ar e within the scope of which modal s . Jackendoff says 
t his can be determined usually (though not always) from t he syntactic 
structure . He says there are three types of syntactic scope, each 
predictabl e from the syntactic properties of the lexical item bearing 
the modal . For verbs and other items which are capable of strictly 
subcategorizing NP ' s or S's (such as adjectives like possible), the 
scope of the modal operator is one of the NP's subcategorized by the 
lexical item bearing it. This i$ called Type I scope . So, the object 
but not the subject of want will be in the scope of UNRJ:!ALIZED, for 
example . For possible ,"tile compl ement cl ause will be within the scope 
of POSSIBLE. 
For auxiliary verbs, the scope of the modal (POSSIBLE in the 
case of may or might, FUTURE in the case of will) is all the material 
commanded by the modal. For the purpose of allowing S' s to be in the 
scope of the modal, Jackendoff extended the notion of co=nd to 
include the dominating Snode. This is called Type II scope. 
For determiners (quantifi ers and numbers) plus the particle not, 
the scope is all the material to the right which is commanded by the 
lexical item (the dominating Snode is to be included in this) . This 
is Type III scope . 
Further, the scope for verbs is claimed to be read off the deep 
structure ; for auxiliary verbs and determiners , the scope is determined 
at surface structure. This is shown by the fact that, for instance, 
PASSIVE does not affect the scope of verbs since (93) can still have a 
nonspecific reading (i . e . an expert is still dependent on UNREALIZED) , 
whereas PASSIVE changes the preferably nonspecific many in (94a) to 
specific . 
(93) 
(94) 
An expert is needed by this committee. 
a. The teacher didn ' t pas$ many of the students. 
b . Many of the students veren't passed by the teacher. 
Whereas many was within the scope of NEGATIVE i n deep str ucture, it is 
outside of it in surface structure . Corresponding to the nonspecific 
reading in the passive would be (95). 
(95) Not many of the students were passed by the teacher . 
The best way to avoid this scope-changing is to read the scope for 
negatives and quantifiers from the surface struct ure . Jackendoff gives 
more examples to show that it is not just PASSIVE that affects this 
change . Keeping the order of the operators stright requires a global 
constraint in Generative Semantics, so it can't be stated as constraints 
on individual transformations. 
In Jackendoff (1975a), a new modal operator IMAGE is introduced. 
This operator is present in those lexical items which have to do with images 
like painting, picture , image and in verb$ of mental-image like believe , 
think , suppose , etc . A NP is within the scope of IMAGE if its location 
is within an image- containing object . Location refers to the thematic 
relations mentioned earlier. To illustrate, consider (96a) and (96b): 
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(96) a. Unicorns exist only in Africa. Cnon-imageJ 
b . Unicorns exist only in pictures . CimageJ 
In both these sentences locations are expressed for unicorns. But 
whereas in (96a) they are real unicorns, in (96b) the location is in 
an image- containing object , so unicorns is dependent on IMAGE. The 
modal condition for IMAGE says that the referent is an image. In most 
cases pragmatic conditions will force the NP in !MAGE ' s scope to be 
dependent on it since, for example , real unicorns cannot exist in 
pictures. In a case like (97), some red paint l!l.ight not be dependent 
on IMAGE since real red paint can exist in a picture . 
(97) In that picture, there is some red paint . 
If some red paint is dependent on IMAGE, then we are talking about a 
picture of some red paint. But usually, NP's must be dependent on 
IMAGE if they are within the scope. Also S's are very likely to be 
dependent on IMAGE due to pragmatic conditions; hence in (98a) and 
(98b), there may be real-red paint on the image- arm so red paint and 
the whole S would not be dependent on IMAGE, but a rea.l cast cannot be 
located in a painting so everything must be dependent on IMAGE in (98b). 
(98) a. In that painting there is red paint on Frank ' s arm. 
b . In that painting there is a cast on Frank's arm. 
The important thing to note is that even though the scope of IMAGE 
i§ !l~ll\Al'Jt1tAlly d<!!termined (which -weakens the theory, since all the 
others are syntactically determined), it is still a relatively easy 
matter to decide whether a NP or a S is within the scope of the modal. 
In particular, in the case of the believe class of verbs, since they 
strictly subcategorize theircomplement Ss, the scope is determined at 
the level of deep structure. 
4.2.5. There appear to be interacti~ns between the various parts of 
the semantic representation. This is to be expected. I would like to 
discuss one such interaction ;,bich affects the modal NEGATIVE, among 
others. Consider the following: 
(99) a. 
b. 
Howard didn't kill an ant. 
Howard didn't see Alex kill an ant. 
In (99a), there is a strong preference for reading an ant as non-
specific (i.e. dependent on NEGATIVE) and the sentence Ho;,ard killed 
an ant is a.lmost obligatorily dependent on NEGATIVE. But consider (99b). 
'l'he main ~lause Howard saw ... is obligatorily dependent on the modal, 
but this is not so for the complement clause. There is a reading, which 
is not too bard to get, in which Alex kil.led an ant but Howard didn't 
see it . In thie case, an ant must also be not dependent on the modal: 
since i~ Alex did kill an ant, it must be a specific ant. 
It is important to see that th:e negative sometimes only makes a 
claim about the clause where it is syntactically located. (99b) 
definitely says that there was no act of seeing Alex kill an ant taking 
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place, but it really doesn't say anything one way or the other about 
whether an act of killing took place. 
The particular verb which intervenes can determine what the 
changes are that the subordinate clause will be dependent on NEGATIVE. 
For instance, factive verbs like realize or regret tend to be strong 
blocks against dependence. 
{100} a. I didn't realize that Richard married a Yugoslavian. 
b. I don't regret that the people elected a woman. 
In both of these cases, the embedded clauses and the indefinite MPs 
are almost obligatorily read as not dependent on NEGATIVE (i.e., the 
NP is specific}. 
On the other hand, an implicative verb, when negated, implies the 
negation of its complement, so it represents no block to dependence at 
all, as seen in (101). 
(101) a . I didn't manage to win a prize . 
b. Harry didn't happen to meet a hooker. 
In these sentences, the complements are negative and the NPs are non-
specific. 
Some of the cases in between are harder to decide. The particular 
class that is of interest here are the verbs containing the modal IMAGE 
(henceforth IMAGE-verbs). In a sentence like (102) it is claimed that 
an image of John killing a man doesn't exist. 
(102) I didn't say that John killed a man. 
There certainly is the possibility of a man and kill being not dependent 
on NEGATIVE. This is as opposed to (102) where kill and a man are 
definitely dependent on NEGATIVE. 
(103) I said that John \tidn ' t kill a ma:n. 
The Il.fAGE-verh blocks the obligatory dependence on NEGATIVE in (102) 
1~ote that any and some items of weaker negative polarity like 
lif't a finger seemingly may appear in the scope of a negative, without 
actually being dependent on the NEGATIVE modal, unlike until . 
(104) a. I didn't realize that Harry had killed anyone. 
b. l!arry didn't kill anyone. 
In (104b), for any referent you pick, you may claim that Harry 
didn't kill him. No such claim can be made in (104a) . Hence anyone 
appears to not be dependent on NEGATIVE in (104a) . It is within the 
scope of the not, how~ver, so anyone is possible. Until in a similar 
position would be ungrammatical . 
This appears to be a problem for Jackendoff, who claims (1972, 
section 8 . 3) that ~must be dependent on the NEGATIVE to appear . 
This seems intuitively correct to me, but then (104a) is \Ulexplained. 
Perhaps when this blocking phenomenon is better understood, the problem 
can be cleared up. 
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This blocking is important because I claim that until, the tag 
question interpretation rule, and the VP-Anaphora rules require a 
sent~nce's absolute dependence on NEGATIVE to qualify as being negated, 
as will be seen in section 5. 
It might also be noted here that blocking occurs with other modals 
of Type II and Type III scope. For instance, 
(105) a. 
b . 
Seven people think John ate an apple . CMULTIPLEJ 
Jerry might believe that Richard erased a tape. 
tPOSSIBLEJ 
c. Jeb vill say that Richard promised him a 
money. CFOTUREJ 
sum of 
In each of these cases, there are clear readings where the final NP 
is specific and where the embedded sentences are definitely not dependent 
on the modals, yet, if the verb is right, the embedded sentence vill be 
dependent on the modal: 
(106) a. Seven people will manage to get a high grade. 
b . Jerry might happen to show up at the OSU-Michigan 
game. 
c. Sherry will remember to feed the cat . 
If the sentence is expressive, this blocking vill not occur. In 
the case of expressive sentences with a main clause NIDATIVE, NEG-
ASSOCIATION will apply and the complement sentence will be dependent on 
NEllAT?Vt. MUJ.1.l'~~. FOSS!BLE and. F'u'TUru;l cannot. appear in !:.he me.in 
clause of expressive sentences (recall section 3.2.4), so blocking 
will alvays be possible in those cases, althougll it will not always 
occur. 
I don't really knowhow to explain when or how spedific IMAGE-verbs 
used reportively vlll block dependence of the lover clause on NEGATIVE . 
For now, we can note that it does o,;,cur and it wil.l be indicated simply 
by the removal o f items from among NEGATIVE ' s dependents in a sentence . 
~. 2 . 6 . One additional point might be briefly made. Jackendoff 
suggests that the modal $tructure is where the illocutionary force of 
a sentence might be indicated . His discussion of the WR modal in 
questions provides some interesting descriptions and a logical next 
step might be to include imperatives, declaratives, performatives and 
so on, all in the modal structure somehow. For instance, just as!!!!. 
artichoke is non-specific in a WH question, it is non-specific in an 
imperative, cf. (107), 
(107) a. Who ate an artichoke? 
b. Eat an artichoke . 
Much more research needs to be done on this matter, obviously. 
I mention this matter here because the illocutionary force of the 
sentence is an important factor, as ;re have seen, in the NEG-ASSOCIATION 
process and it would be nice to be able to include the relevant informa-
tion on illocutionary force (however that is done) into a part of the 
!Q8.Chinery \¥hich already has independent e\l'idence for its existence . 
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4. 3 . Formulation of the NEG-ASSOCIATION rule 
4.3.1. We are nov ready to attempt one formulation of a semantic 
interpretation rule to replace NEG-RAISING. Before I attempt to do that 
I must repeat the disclaimer raised in section 3.3, namely that I am 
unable to specify formally what the conditions are which allow the rule 
to operate . Obviously, there is a restriction in terms of which 
specific predicates can undergo the rule, but there also must be an 
expressive force to the sentence. This expressive force may eventually 
find its description in the modal structure, as suggested in section 
4.2.6, but I cannot do it within the limits of this paper. For the 
purposes of formulating the rule, I will refer to the notion of a NEG-
ASSOCIATION verb: a verb (or a predicate like likely) which allows NEC--
ASSOCIATION. This characteristic is to be indicated in the lexical 
entry, eventually as part of the semantic content, but for now as an 
arbitrary.looking feature (recall the lack of significance of this 
fudge, as mentioned in section 4.1.3.). I will not discuss the nature 
of these verbs or the nature o~ the expressiveness any fUrther, but 
will assume that both must be J)resent for the rule to operate . 
4.3.2. As a first approximation, we might suggest that NEG- ASSOCIATION 
replaces the itemsdependent on NEGATIVE (call them its dependents). 
The modal structure of (108) without NEG-ASSOCIATION is (109). 
(108) I don't think Ellen ate the pretzels . 
(109) NEGATIVE (think), ate lJ,IAGE (Ellen, ate, the pretzels) . 
Now, suppose we vere to say that ~ASSOCIATION replaces the dependents 
of NEGATIVE with those of IMAGE. This would give (110). 
(110) NEGATIVE (Ellen, ate, the pretzels) IMAGE (Ellen, ate, 
the pretzels) 
But this is not the correct modal dependence structure for the sentence. 
In particular , it says that :Ellen and the pretzels are dependent on 
NEGATIVE, vhicll would claim that there are no referents for them. But 
definite NPs cannot b9 dependent on modals (except Il4AGE) since they are already specific . This is a pra!!Jl],8.tic confiict, and the sentence 
with a definite NP dependent on NEGATIVE should be rejected. Therefore 
NEG- ASSOCIATION must work some other way. 
4. 3. 2 . A better idea seems to be that NEG- ASSOCIATION removes material 
from dependence on NEGATIVE. However, there aTe still several alterna-
tives, For instance, since the sentence (lll) is the sentence that (108} 
is synonymous with, it' NEG-ASSOCIATION applies we might susgest 
that the modal structure be changed from (109) to (112), with the 
embedded subject considered to be to the left of the not (i . e . not 
dependent on it) . --
(111) I think that Ellen didn't eat the pretzels . 
(112) NEGATIVE (ate) IMAGE (Ellen, ate, the pretzels) . 
In other words, by this formulation , NEG ASSOCIATION would remove from 
dependence on NEGATIVE all elements preceding the IMA.GE verb. However, 
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there are examples which show that this rule would produce the wrong 
results. 
Consider (113a) , with a modal structure of (113b) . 
(ll.3) a . I don ' t think that many people saw Rhoda tonight. 
b . NEGATIVE (think, many, saw) , IMAGE (many people , 
saw, Rhoda) , MULTIPLE (people, saw). 
If NEG-ASSOCIATION applies as we have formulated it, the modaJ. structur e 
will be (114b), which corresponds to the sentence (ll4a) . 
(114) a. I think that many people didn't see Rhoda tonight . 
b. NEGATIVE (saw), IMAGE (many people, saw, Rhoda), 
MULTIPLE (people, saw) . 
But (114a) and (113a) are not synonymous . (113a) is synonymous with 
(115a), which has the modal structure (ll5b) . 
(115) a. I think that not many people saw Rhoda tonight . 
b . NEGATIVE (many , saw) , IMAGE ( many people , saw, 
Rhoda) , MULTIPLE (people , saw) . 
This suggests that the subject of the embedded clause is still 
dependent on NEGATIVE after NEG- ASSOCIATION . This would mean that an 
indefinite subject would be read as nonspecific . 
(ll6) I don ' t believe that a man is coming. 
If (116) is read so that NEG-ASSOCIATiotl has applied, a man will have 
no referent (i.e . , it will be nonspecific, dependent on NEGATIVE) . If 
it is read so that a man has a specific referent, then the sentence 
is reportive and NEG-ASSOCIATION has not taken place . This is what 
the formulation of NEG-ASSOCIATION should predict. If the rule doesn ' t 
apply, t he IMAGE-verb blocks the dependence of the lower sentences on 
NIDATIVE, just as if the verb were not a NEG- ASSOCIATION ver b . 
The formalization of the rule is this : 
(117) NEG-ASSOCIATION (obligatory) 
Given a modal structur e as follows: NEGATIVE (X1, 
X2,·· .,~ , Y1 , Y2 ,•·· ), ~(W1,W2 ,··· ), M1 (N1,N2, .. . ), 
M2( ... ) , ..•where ~ is a NEG-ASSOCIATION verb , where 
Y1 ,Y2,··· may equal W1,W2 , ... and where the sentence 
is expressive, change the modal structure to : 
NEGATIVE ( Y 1 , Y2 ... ) , !(W1, W2, ... ) , M1 (Nl,N2 .. • ) , · .. 
4.3 .4. Notice that the rule as stated now is obligatory. If the rule 
does not apply, then the sentence is not expressive . Conversely if 
a sentence which meets the structural description of the rule , like 
(116) for instance, is claimed to be expressive then NEG- ASSOCIATION 
must have taken place. Let's look again at the passives in section 
3.2 . 5. 
Remember that a passive sentence like (118b) is not ambiguous 
like its active counterpart (117a) . 
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(ll8) a . Joel doesn ' t believe that Hildy is coming. 
b. That Hildy is coming is not believed by Joel. 
The modal structures of these sentences before NEG- ASSOCIATION are 
(119a) and (ll9b), respectively . 
(ll9) a. NEGATIVE (believe, coming), IMAGE (Hildy, coming) 
b. NEGATIVE (believe), IMAGE (Hildy, collling) 
As we mentioned in section 3 .2 . 5, (118b) is not expressive, so NEG-
ASSOCIATION is not allowed and (118b) will be unambiguous. The 
difference in modal structure is due to the fact that NEGATIVE's 
dependent are determined at the surface structure (because not has 
Type III scope) and IMAGE ' s are determined at deep structure-. -PASSIVE 
removes the complement sentence from dependence on NEGATIVE, but not 
from dependence on IMAGE. The fact that the complement in (118b) is 
not dependent on NEGATIVE may lead strength to the idea that it is 
presupposed. 
If EXTRAPOSITION applies to (ll8b), we get (120),which also has 
the modal structure (119a). 
(120) It is not believed by Joel and Hildy is coming. 
NEG-ASSOCIATION is possible here, and, as expected, {.120) is ambiguous . 
Further, RAISING may now apply to give {121), and its modal structure is 
again (119a) • 
(121) Hildy is not believed by Joel to be coming. 
In these cases, when NEG-ASSOCIATION applies the resulting scope will 
oe (122). 
(:L22) NEGATIVE (coming), IMAGE (Hildy, coming) 
Notice that by this account, PASSIVE and RAISING can change 
meaning, since PASSIVE puts Joel into the scope of not, and RAISING 
removes Hildy i'rom not ' s seope. If either of these two NP's had 
been inde:finite, a meaning change could result. 
(123) a . A man doesn ' t think I ' m co~.ing. 
b. ?That I ' m coming is not thought by' a man . 
In (.123a), a man is specific, but 1n (~23b) it is preferably non-
speci:fic . A1.so compare (l24a) and (124b) : 
(124) a. It is not tho.ught by Joel that a girl is coming 
today . 
o. A girl is not thought by Joel to be coming today. 
c . ??It is thought by Joel that not a girl is coming 
today. 
d . It is thought by Joel- that a girl. is not coming 
today. 
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In (124b) a girl is pr eferably specific , wher eas this is the weaker 
r eading in (124a) . This changing of meaning does not affect the 
ambiguity possibilities of the sentence, once you remember that the 
result of NEG- ASSOCIATION on (124a) gi ves a sentence like (124c) and 
not (124d). 
4. 3. 5. The NEG-ASSOCIATION rule also says that if there i s anything 
between not and the NEG-ASSOCIATION verb, it i$ excluded from 
dependence on NEGATIVE after the rule applies . In (125), NEG-
ASSOCIATION must be applying. 
(125) Scarcel y anybody thinks she is not coming until 
tomorrow. 
since until is acceptabl e . A paraphrase for scar cely anybody here 
would be almost not anybody , with an overt negative with anybody in 
its scope. A!'ter NEG- ASSOCIATION applies , the paraphrase of (125) 
would be (126) . 
(126) Almost anybody thinks she is not coming until 
tomorrow . 
In this case , anybody is read as a universal quantifier, which is the 
correct reading for the sentence . Jackendoff (1972: section 8. 3) , 
following Vendler (1967), says that any presents the hearer with a 
choice of referent . In a sentence like (127a) the claim is made that 
whatever thing you choose , John didn't see it. 
(127} a . John didn ' t see anything. 
b . Anybody can add two and t...,o . 
In (12Tb), •.hatever person you choose, they can add two and two. Thus, 
each meaning o:t ii) is captured by this account. The correct meanings 
for (125) and (12 can be generated with NEG-ASSOCIATION and Vendler ' s 
characterization of any , which Jackendoff (1972: 339) says has no 
equivalent in the predicate calculus. 
4.4. Summary . 
This has been a brief explication of the general f r amework I a.m 
using and of the alternative to a NEG-RAISING transformation, the 
semantic interpretation rule of NEG- ASSOCIATION. In the next section , 
this framework ans this rule will be tested on the data given in 
sect ion l, to see if it can correctly provide an explanation for the 
data that NEG-RAISING vas created to explain. 
5. Another Look at the Data . 
In this section, I would like to show how the semantic interpreta-
tion rule of MID-ASSOCIATION interacts with the rest of the interpretive 
rules to construct semantic representations for sentences . Io 
particular, I would like to consider the data given in section 2 as 
evidence for the syntactic transformation, to see bow they may be taken 
into account in the interpretive framework . 
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5 , 1. until 
5.1 .1. The lexical expression until, along with the idiomatic lift 
a finger, in years and other negative polarity items have a selectional 
restriction on them which requires a negativelO in the same sentence 
with them. Since selectional restrictions are considered to be 
semantic in nature, in a Generative Semantics framework, this requires 
the NEG to be a clause-mate of the until in the deep (i.e. semantic) 
structure of the sentence. In an Interpretive Semantics framework, 
the selectional restrictions, as well-forroedness conditions on semantic 
interpretations, are not checked until the complete semantic representation 
is formed . In this case, it •-ill be after the NEG-ASSOCIATION rule has operated. 
Consider the following examples, repeated from section 2 .1 .1. 
(128) a. *r think the trial will finish until next month. 
b. I don't think the trial will finish until next 
month . 
c. I think the trial won't finish until next month. 
To form the modal structure the modal projection rule will be 
applied to each of the modal-carrying words, think, will and~. 
The NPs the trial and next month are both definite, so they cannot be 
dependent on FUTURE, although they can be dependent on IMAGE, and 
the embedded sentence will be dependent on IMAGE and FUTURE; thus, 
(129) is the modal structure of (128a). 
(129} IMAGE (the trial, finish, next month), FUTtJRE 
(finish) 
The selectional restriction on until will be considered to be 
satisfied if the sentence containing until is obligatorily dependent 
on NEGATIVE. Since this is not the case in (129), the select ion.al 
restriction is violated and (128a) is bad. 
For (128b), the srune things will be dependent on FUTURE and 
IMAGE. Under the reportive reading where no NEG-ASSOCIATION applies, 
the IMAGE verb blocks the lower sentence from definitely being 
dependent on NEGATIVE, so the entire modal structure for (128b) will 
be (130) . 
(130) IMAGE (the trial, finish, next month), FUTURE 
(finish), NEGATIVE (think). 
Reportively, (128b) is the negation of (128a), so the selectional 
restriction is not met and the sentence is again out . If the main 
verb in (128b) were a non- NEG-ASSOCIA'rION verb, this would be the 
only choice, but for think we can apply NEG-ASSOCIATION to (128b) to 
get (128c). The modal structure is based on (128c) is (131). 
(131) IMAGE (the trial, finish, next month} FUTURE 
(finish) NEGATIVE (finish) 
In this reading of (128b), the embedded sentence is dependent 
on NEGATIVE, so the selectional restriction is satisfied and. (128b) has 
a good reading. Motice that (128c), which is synonymous witb the 
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good reading of (128b) , also has the modal structure (131.) . 
5 .1 . 2. Consider next t he sentences with the 'inherently negative 
constituents' whi ch inspired Klima to suggest NEG-ABSORPTION. They 
are repeated here . 
(132) a. She is too weak to have another child unt i l 1978 . 
b . Bill is afraid to leave WJtil his mot her comes. 
c . I doubt he will arrive until next month. 
d. My diet forbids me to eat until mealtime . 
e. Scarcel y anybody expected him to resign until 
next year. 
Of these (132c) and (132d), with the NEGATIVE modal contained in a 
verb, are easier to handle . The scope of a modal contained in a verb 
is determined at deep structure and it consists of one of the NP ' s 
subcategorized by the verb . In these two cases, the complement 
sentence is in the scope of the modal. The deep structures will be 
something like (133a)-(133b). 
(133) a . I doubt Che will arrive until next weekfi 
b. My diet forbids [I eat until mealtime). 
and the modal structures will be, respectively. 
(134) a . NEGATIVE (arrive) FUTURE (arrive) 
b. NEGATIVE (eat) 
Since the Jil's are definite, they will not be dependent on NEGATIVE. 
From these dependence relationships , we can see that the embedded 
sentences are dependent on NEGATIVE, and ths selectional restrictions 
on until are satisfied. 
For (132a) and (132b), even though too and afraid are not verbs, 
they do strictly subcategorize a complement clause, and so the 
compl ement clauses will be within the scope of the modal . Indefinite 
noun phrases in the complement clause may be not dependent on 
NEGATIVE, as in (135a) and (135b), 
(135) a. Sally is too shy to go out with a friend . 
b . Bill is afraid to propose to an actress . 
where the J;Ps a friend and an actress have possible specific readings 
(i.e. not dependent on NEGATIVE), but the complement sentences them-
selves are still dependent (i.e. Sally is not going out and Bill is 
not proposing). The modal structures for (132a) and (132b) are in (136}: 
(136) a. NEGATIVE (have) 
b. NEGATIVE (leave) 
These modal structures also satisfy the selectional restriction on 
until. 
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Sentence (132e) has a NEGATIVE in scarcely. This undergoes 
NEG- ASSOCIATION to place the embedded sentence dependent on NEGATIVE, 
to satisfy until. 
Some people think a similar sentence with a non- NEG- ASSOCIATION 
verb is grammatical . See section 5 .1 . 4 . for a discussion or these 
type of sentences. 
5.1 . 3 . The alternative to NEG-ABSORPTION was lexical decomposition 
or the inherently negative constituents into parts which contained an 
overt negative.' Since this is not allowed in a strictly lexicalist 
gra.rran.~r, it would be nice to be able to explain the data without 
resorting to it. The original sentences in (132) have already been 
taken care of without the aid of lexical decomposition. 
Next consider (137a) a.nd (137b), the sentences which lexica.l 
decompsoition could not forbid. 
(137) a. *I don't doubt she will come until tomorrow. 
b. *Bill isn't afraid to leave until his mother comes . 
In the present system, the verbs come and leave (i.e. their sentences) 
will be dependent on two NEGATIVESeach, one coming from the not, the 
other from doubt or afraid. 12 The two negatives cancel each7ther 
outl3 and the embedded sentence gets a reading which is dependent on 
no negatives, and so the selectional restriction is violated. 
Sentences similar to (137), but -without until, will have perfectly 
acceptable readings, as will the sentences in (138) which gave NEG-
ABSORPTION t he problem of having to generate two negatives in the lower 
auxiliary. 
(138) a. Bill is afraid not to leave. 
b. Ali is too clever not to win. 
5.1.4. Lindholm (1969) mentions some very puzzling sentences which 
are grammatical for some speakers. 
(139) a. I didn't realize that I had to do it until 
tomorrow. 
b. I realized that I didn't have to do it until 
tomorrow. 
(140) a. I didn't claim that I would finish the paper 
until Friday. 
b. I claimed that I wouldn't finish the paper until 
Friday. 
(141) a. It isn't clear that he'll leaYe until next week. 
b . It is clear that be won't leave until next week. 
(142) a. I can't believe that he would take the test until 
he's ready. 
b. I can bleieve that he wouldn't take the test 
until he's ready. 
The (a) sentences are not paraphrases of the (b) sentences, to this 
cannot be NEG- RAISING/NEG- ASSOCIATION in operation . In particular, 
how can the (a) sentences satisfy the sel ectional restrictions on 
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until) (Al.so in this category are some sentences mentioned in section 
5.1.2, like Scarcely anybody says he will come until tomorrow.) 
A possible solution in this framework would be this: In these 
sentences, the not definitelY includes the complement sentences in its 
scope. I have claimed, however, in section 4 . 2.6 that the presence 
of certain verbs {realize, claim, clear, can't believe all. qualify as 
members of this set) would sometimes block the embedded sentence from 
dependence on NEGATIVE. These sentences would seem to be cases where 
the dependence is not blocked. There must be some cases where the 
complement~ dependent on NEGATIVE, as we have seen (cf. (131), so 
(139)-(142) are not entirely unexpected. Notice that all of the 
complement sentences are dependent on FUTURE also. This may be a 
factor, especially where the tenses of the sentences are considered. 
In particular, (139a) gets a different meaning if tomorrow is replaced 
by yesterday, where the until phrase modifies I don't realize. I 
cannot go into all the problems these sentences present , but they 
may find some partial explanation here as relaxations of the blocking, 
for whatever reason. 
5.1.5. To sum up the results of this section, all of the examples 
from section 2 .1 have been accounted for without the use of the 
transformations NEG-RAISING, NEG-ABSORPTION and without lexical 
decomposition. 
5 . 2. Tag questions 
5 . 2 .1. The transformational account of tag-questions is based on the 
rule first developed in J(].im~ (1964) . The tag consists of the first 
part of the auxiHary (do appears if there is only a tense marker in 
the auxil.ia.ry) and a proii°ominal copy of the subject from the main 
sentence. In addition, the tag has opposite polarity from the main 
$entence with respect to negativity. 
This rule generates ooly 'normal' tags. If the tag is considered 
to be sarcastic or otherwise different from the normal meaning of a 
tag question , a matching polarity tag may appear. 
In an interpretive framework., either a pbsitive tag or a 
negative tag may appear, and the matching or non-matching of polari-
ties will affect the meaning and/or the illocutionary force of the 
sentence . The intonation of the tag (rising or falling) will also 
have to be taken into account for the entire reading. 
5,:,?.2. With respect to the data, the two approaches seeJD equally 
capable of explaining what is happening. There will have to be some 
principles, presumably relating to illocutionary force, that describe 
the conditions under which the complement clause may be the basis for 
the tag (see section 3 . 2.4 . ). The crucial sentence (repeated from 
section 2) is (143}, 
(143) I don ' t suppose the Phillies will win, will they? 
which R. Lakof'.r accounted for with her (cyclic} !lEG-RAISING, but it can be 
just as easily explained by the use of NEG-ASSOCIATION. If NEG-
ASSOCIATION were not operating (i.e. the main e,entence is reportive), 
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the modal projection rule would operate to give the modal structure 
(144) . 
(144) a . NEGATIVE (suppose) IMAGE (the Phillies, vin) 
FUTURE (win) 
b , NEGATIVE (win) IMAGE (the Phillies, win) FUTURE 
(win) 
In this case the complement sentence would be blocked from dependence 
in negation by the IMAGE- containing verb suppose used reportively . 
Thus the complement sentence would be positive, and a positive tag 
should produce a different meaning for the sentence. This is what 
would happen if suppose in (143) were replaced by~ or claim or some 
other non- NEG-ASSOCIATION verb. 
However, the fact that the tag is formed on the complement means 
that (143) must be expressive. Therefore NEG- ASSOCIATION must apply 
if it can. But, for NEG- ASSOCIATION verbs like SUpPOSe, NEG-
ASSOCIATION will apply giving (144b). The complement sentence 
cannot be blocked f'rom dependence on NEGATIVE because the sentence is 
expressive . The complement sentence is negated, so a positive tag 
will give the desired reading, which is the same as (145) (which also 
has the modal structure (144b). 
(145) I suppcse the Phillies won't win, will they? 
The sentences in (146) 
(146) a . I don't think they'll vin, will they? 
b , I don't believe they ' ll win, will they? 
which by NEG- RAISING would have come from the bad (147a) and (147b) 
(147) a. *I think they won't win, will they? 
b.?*I believe they won't win, will they? 
were problems in the Generative Semantics framework and remain so 
here. The fact that (146a) and (146b) are bad would suggest that 
think and believe are not being used expressively in these sentences. 
It is not clear to me whether this is so. Perhaps, as the semantic 
and/or illocutionary conditions for the occurrence of embedded 
sentence tags become worked out, the problem may receive an answer 
which would be compatible with either the Generative or Interpretive 
approach. 
5 .3. Parentheticals 
5 , 3 .1 . The Generative Semantics treatment of parentheticals, as 
described in section 2.3, was provided by Ross (l9T3) , In that paper 
Ross mentions some of the problems his solution can't handle . For 
instance, there ia no explanation of why most verbs cannot appear as 
negative parentheticals, since presumably the lifted S could appear 
as a complement under many negated verbs . The example (148a) may not 
undergo SLI1'TING to give (148b), even if negation is present in the 
lower sentence. 
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(148) a. I don ' t claim Wallace wil l be elected. 
b. *Wallace will (not) be elected, I don't claim. 
The one neat result (relevant to this discussion) that Ross gets 
is an explanation of why the NEG-RAISING verbs ~ appear as negative 
parentheticals and only with negated complements. In this case, the 
source of (149) must be (150a), and not (150b), in underlying structure . 
(149) This guy is not corrupt, I don't think. 
(150) a. I think this gu:y is not corrupt. 
b. I don't think this guy is corrupt . 
The NEG in (150b) is copied, the embedded sentence undergoes SLIFTING, 
and the original NEG is deleted, giving (149). If the NEG originates 
in the upper sentence, then the verb could be presume, insist, 
confess or many others, and SLIFTING would produce a sentence like 
(149) . Since ~hese other verbs are all bad in this case, saying 
that the NEG originates in the l ower sentence says that only the 
NEG-RAISING verbs will be able to appear. But this still doesn ' t 
explain why (150b) should be bad as a source for (149) . 
5 .3.2. Jackendoff (1972: section 3.1.2) treats parentheticals like 
sentence adverbs. He generates them directly where they appear on the 
surface--as opposed to Ross, who uses SLIF'rING to put the parentheticals 
at the end and a rule called tiICHING (which also applies to sentence 
adverbs) to move the parenthetical to where it appears. While I 
don't want to compare the two overall systems, I would like to demon-
strate that via NEG-ASSOCIATION, it can be explained how it is 
possible for the verbs which may undergo that rule to appear as 
negative parentheticals . 
The semantic interpretation for parentheticals is by his projection 
rule PsPEAKER for speaker-oriented adverbs, which embeds the sentence 
as an argument in the function generated in the semantic representa-
tion of the adverb . For example, in (151) the functional structure 
PREFER (the voters, Rhodes) becomes the argument in the function 
EVIDENT (X) giving the funcational structure (152). 
(151) Evidently, the voters prefer Rhodes. 
(152) EVIDENT (PREFER (THE VOTERS, RHODES) } 
A parenthetical can also be considered as a one-place predicate, 
for ex.ample, THINK (I ,X). So (153a) gets the functional structure 
(153b) by inserting the reading of the main sentence as the argumen·t 
in the parenthetical: 
(153) a. The voters prefer Rhodes, I think. 
b . THINK (I, PREFER (THE VOTERS , RHODES ) ) 
Notice that (153b) has the same functional structure as would be 
generated for (154). 
(154) I think the voters prefer Rhodes. 
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So even though (153a) and (154) were generated syntactically in 
different ways, they receive identical functional structures. 
Notice, however, that the difference in syntactic generation 
results in a different modal structure; in (153a) the sentence the 
voters prefer Rhodes is outside the scope of think, so it cannot be 
dependent on IMAGE. This is shown by the lack of an opaque reading 
in (155). Only the contradictory transparent reading exists. 
(155) *The voters prefer Rhodes, he thinks, but they don't. 
Thus, for the sentences (156a) and (156b) the modaJ. structures 
will be (157a) and (157b). 
(156) a. The voters don't like Gilligan, I don't think. 
b . I don't think the voters like Gilligan. 
(157) a. NEGATIVE (like), NEGATIVE (think), IMAGE ( 
b. NEGATIVE (think, like), IMAGE (the voters, 
like, Gill.igan) 
If NEG-ASSOCIATION applies to (157a), the modal structure is (158). 
(158) NEGATIVE (like), NEGATIVE ( ) think ( ) 
This is the same as the modal structure for (159) . 
(1.59) The voters don't like Gilligan, I think. 
If the verb was not a NEG-ASSOCIATION verb, we would have no way of 
eliminating the extra negative from the semantic representation of 
(156a). But by NEG-ASSOCIATION we can explain why (159) and (156a) 
are synonymous. 
This account also explains the fact that the negtative parenthe-
ticals which do occur never have the power to negate the main sentence 
by themselves. What is unexplained is 'Why a sentence like (160) 
could not exist where the negative in the parenthetical would remain, 
since there is no NEG-ASSOCIATION verb present. 
(160) *The voters prefer Gilligan, I don't presume. 
So while a complete explanation of parentheticals is still far away, 
the interpretive theory can account for the same things the NEG-
COPYING plus NEG-DELETION scheme can, without the troubles that 
analysis entails. 
5.4. The late rules 
5.4.1 . In an Interpretive Semantics framework, no transformation may 
refer to the purely semantic notion of coreference. Therefore all 
rules which are deletion under identity are disallowed. This includes 
the rules of SENTENCE-PRONOMINALIZATION, SLUICING, and VP DELETION. 
The interpretive grammar would have anaphora or empty nodes (symbolized 
by a) generated in the deep structure, i.e. lexical insertion on a 
node is optional. If any empty node remains uninterpreted at the end 
of the derivation, the sentence is rejected as ill-formed. Rules 
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of VP-Anaphora interpretation (cf. Jackendoff 1972: ch. 6) would fi:Ll 
in the semantic reading for the empty nodes or the anaphora it, do so 
and so on. Providing details of the exact forms of t he ruleswould 
be too lengthy for this paper . For the purposes of this discussion, 
I will assume that there are rules that can be worked out along the 
lines Akmajian (1970) and Jackendoff suggest. In any event, it will 
be seen that the rule of NEG-ASSOCIATION must precede the rules for 
VP-Anaphora. 
5.4.2. Compare (161a) and (161b) (sentence (161a) is from setion 
2.4.1): 
(161) a . I don't think John loves Marsha anymore, but 
she doesn't realize it yet. 
b. I don't claim John loves Marsha, but she 
believes it. 
In (161a) it clearly refers to John doesn't love Marsha anymore but 
the it in (l6lb) cannot mean this, but only John loves Marsha. This 
must be explained. 
I would claim that the verb claim blocks the lower sentence from 
dependence on the modal NEGATIVE (as discussed in section 4 .2.6) so 
that the modal structure can only be (162). 
(162) NEGATIVE (claim, anyone), IMAGE (John, Marsha, 
love) 
In other words John loves Marsha is not dependent on JfEGATIVE, so the 
VP- Anaphora rule would not interpret a negative in the reading of .!a!.· 
In developing the modal structure for (161a), think would also 
block the dependence of the lower sentence on NEGATIVE if there were 
no NEG-ASSOCIATION (i.e. if the sentence were reportive) . But if 
NEG-ASSOCIATION applies to (163) then there is nothing to block the 
complement sentence from being dependent on NEGATIVE. 
(163) NEGATIVE (think, 10,,e . anymore), IMAGE (,John ., love, 
Marsha) JIBG (realize) 
The modal structure is (164) which has love dependent on NEGATIVE, 
as we want for the interpretation of it by the VP-Anaphora rule. 
(164) NEGATIVE (love, anymore), IMAGE (John, lo-ve, 
Marsha), NEGATIVE (realize) 
The second conjunct in functional structure will be, before and 
after VP-Anaphora: 
(165) a. REALIZE (SHE, IT) 
b . REALIZE (SHE, LOVE (JOHN, MARSHA)) 
The modal structure will change from empty to (166). 
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(166) NEGATIVE (realize) 
The conference table will also be correctly filled in by the operation 
of the rule . The VP-Anaphora rule copies all parts of the semantic 
representation from the first conjunct to the second. 
5.4 . 3. Next consider (167), repeated from section 2. 
(167) He's coming and I can guess why. 
The functional structure of the second conjunct will be roughly (168) 
before the VP-Anaphora rule, and after the rule applies, it will be (169) 
(168) CAN (I, GUESS (I, WHY(o)}) 
(169) CAN (I, GUESS (I, WHY (COME (HE)})) 
This is how the rule works as the counterpart of SLUICING. Perhaps 
WHY will be broken down further in the functional structure, but there 
will still be an argument open, into which the functional structure of 
the referent of the empty nodes will be inserted . 
For (170), the before and after functional structures in the second 
conjunct are also (168) and (169), 
(170) He's not coming and I can guess why. 
but in addition, the VP- Anaphora rule will create the entry in the 
modal structure for the second conjunct (171) which corresponds to the 
modal dependence in the first conjunct. 
(171) JIEGATIVE (come) 
Sentence (172), will also have a similar functional structure change, 
(172} He's not coming and I can guess why not. 
but instead of starting with an empty second conjunct modal structure, 
there will be a NEGATIVE (a) which is filled in by the operation of the 
VP-Anaphora rule . Sentence (173) 
(173) *He's coming and I can guess why not. 
will never have the a replaced in the modal structure, because there is 
nothing dependent on NEGATIVE in the first conjunct for the VP-Anaphora 
rule to copy. The ti will be uninterpreted at tl1e end of the derivation 
and the sentence will be rejected as having an incomplete modal 
structure, just as elements which have uninterpreted empty nodes in 
functional structure are disqualified. 
The crucial example in section 2.4.2, repeated here as (174a), 
can be compared with a similar sentence with claim, (174b), 
(174) a. I don't think he I s coming and I can guess why not . 
b . ?I don't claim he's coming and I can guess why not. 
Reportive claim would block the sentence he's coming from being 
dependent on NEGATIVE for (174b}, 
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but NElJ-ASSOCIATION may apply on (174a) to remove think from the scope 
of not. Hence the why not may refer to he's not coming in (174a) but 
not in (174b} and the application of the VP-Anaphora rule will be 
similar to that discussed above for (172). This assumes, as mentioned 
in 3.2.4, that VP-Anaphora rules may r efer to an embedded clause only 
in expressive cases. If NEG-ASSOCIATION does not apply, then (174a) 
and (174b) have similar readings. There is a possibility of reading 
the why not as whl I don't claim. . . which accounts for the somewhat 
awkward sentence 174b). 
The important thing to remember is that NEG-ASSOCIATION precedes 
VP-Anaphora. 
5,4 . 4 . The problem of neither-tags is discussed qui te thoroughly in 
Jackendoff (1972: sec . 8,7), Basically the approach is the one I used 
in the previous two sections. The VP-Anaphora rule, which is obviously 
at work here, must carry over all parts of the semantic interpretation, 
including the modal structure. In the case of neither, the two 
conjuncts must not only be identical, but must be dependent on NEGATIVE. 
Thus (175) is out 
(175) The Phillies will win and neither will the Mets. 
because the modal structure for the second conjunct contains IIBGATIVE 
(6), which doesn't get altered by the VP-Anaphora rule; the 6 remains 
uninterpreted and the sentence is rejected, 
Notice the difference between {176a) and (176b}, 
(176) a. I don't think the Phillies will win and neither 
will the Mets. 
b. *I don't claim the Phillies will win and neither 
will the Mets. 
In the reportive case (176b), the lower sentence may not be dependent 
on NEGATIVE, 1:>ecause of' the n4AGE- verb blocking it. But with NEG-
ASSOCIATION in the expressive (176a), the think is removed from the 
scope of not, and VP-Anaphora can work to give a correct interpretation 
of the second conjunct. In (176b} the neither reqt1ires a parallel 
negative in the first conjunct, which, since NEG-ASSOCIATION i,i not 
allowed, must be in I don't claim... The lack of' parallelism in the 
au,xiliaries results in a bad sentence. The good version would be (177), 
(177) I don't claim the Phillie$ will win and neither do 
the Mets. 
Once again, NEG-ASSOCIATION must precede the VP-Anaphora rule. 
5, 5, care an~ even 
5. 5.1. Horn (1911) uses the existence of' the NEG- RAISING rule to 
distinguish between the lexica.l items bother and care. He claims that 
both of these verbs are negative polarity items, IT"as shown in (178). 
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(178) a. I don't care to watch. 
b . *I care to watch. 
c . Sly didn't bother to show up. 
d. *Sly bothered to show up. 
He then claims that, while bother doesn't undergo NEG-RAISING because 
it is an implicative verb (cf . Karttunen 1971) , care can undergo NEG-
RAISING, as in a sentence like (178a), where the negative semantically 
is associated with watch. 
There are problems with this analysis of care . First of all, if 
(178a} is derived by the optional rule of NEG-RAISING, then its source, 
(179), shouJ.d also be grammatical, which it isn ' t. 
(179) *I care not to watch. 
Horn suggests that possibl y wish or want is present in deep structure 
and if NEG-RAISING occurs, a care-insertion rule t akes place optionally. 
But this proposal has some serious difficulties, which Horn (125) readily 
admits . For instance,~ is considered to be an implicative verb by 
some, and an 'inference inviter' by others. Thus (180a} strictly implies 
(180b) for some, while for others there is a strongly invited inference 
(180) a. Harry didn't care to eat dinner. 
b. Harry didn't eat dinner . 
that (180b) is tru.e . This could not happen with wish or "'ant . 
Alternatively, we could c_laim that NEG-RAISING is obligatory for 
care. This would not be sufficient, however. The negative incorporation 
into indefinites must be blocked if it removes the negative from care. 
(181) a . I don't want (wish, care) to see anybody today. 
b . I want (with, *Care) to see nobody today. 
Thus, the negative polarity must not only block rules which move a 
negative from care, but roust force rules that move t he negative to a 
position commanding ~ (in this case NEG-RAISING} . This is a highly 
suspicious set of constraints . 
It might be easier to claim that just as bother, as an implicative, 
presents no block against its complement ' s dependency on NEGATIVE, care 
also presents no block, althoµgh ft,r some people it is not an implicative. 
This eliminates any need t:or tricks like the above, and neither NEG-
RAISING nor NEG-ASSOCI~TION is needed to explain (179a). 
A sentence like (182), vhich Horn cl.aims ·requires NEG-RAISillG, can 
be explained easily. 
(182) Until midnight, I didn't care to leave until 2 a.m. 
The lower until is satis!iec by the NEGATIVE in its sentence, and the 
restriction on until midnight can be satisfied by noticing that didn't 
care is a stative predicate, as opposed t -o didn't bother . Sentence 
(182) with bother for ~ is ungrammatical. 
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So NEG-RAISING explains nothing unless a lot of other complicated 
restraints are added, and it looks like the same data \lithout it . 
5.5.2. In the same paper, Horn claims that NEG-RAISING can occur over 
the adverb~, which in his grammar is a higher predicate . His 
anaJ.ysis of the meaning and presupposition which accompany also, 
~ and .2J11:l explain (he claims) why even aJ.lo"1S NEG-RAISING and only 
and aJ.so don't . 
Horn (132) states, 'Even, unlike also, permits NEG- RAISING. But 
the only semantic difference between also--which shares the assertion 
and non-uniqueness presupposition given [earlierJ-- and even is the 
negative expectation presupposed by the latter. And it is just tl')is 
expectation which places even squarely among the NEG-RAISING verbs of 
expectation of Cthe class bel ieve, think, etc.) '. 
Asswning that this can be considered as an exnlanation for even's 
behavior, even and also have several other differe~ces in behavior, both 
syntactic and semantic, and the same thing goes for ™ and only. 
In an Interpretive Semantics grammar, even and only "11.11 not be 
higher predicates, but we still must explain why (183a and (183b) are 
not synonymous like (184a) and (184b) are. 
(183) a. Only Paul didn ' t want to reunite the band . 
b . Not only Paul wanted to reunite the band . 
(1811) a . Even Ringo didn't want to reunite the band. 
b . Not even Ringo wanted to reunite the band. 
First of all, we will not derive these pairs of sentences from similar 
underlying structures. In each case, the not will be present in the 
deep structure just where it occurs on thesurface . (See Jackendoff 
1972: Chapter 8 for some discussion on this). I cannot go into the 
details here of how the readings of the not and even or only are put 
into the sentence . Jackendoff (1972) discusses that in his chapter on 
focus and presupposition. But the details are not important to this 
discussion. What matters is that the word only contains a modal operator 
of some kind. To see this , note that only can allow any in its scope, 
where even cannot . 
(185) a . Only Frank saw anything. 
b. *Even Frank saw anything. 
This means that the modal scope structwes of (183a} and (183b) will 
be different, since in (183b) only will be within the scope of not, 
but this will not be the case for (183a). This difference ln modaJ. 
scope relationships will be the explanation for the difference in 
meaning between the two sentences. 
In (184a) and (184b), there is no difference in the scope 
relationship, since even does not contain a modal . Therefore it 
would make more sense for (184a) and (184b} to have the same reading. 
This does not explain everything about the differences between 
these two sentences, of course . But it is a good place to start, and 
it suggests that there might be an easier way of accounting for the 
facts than to allow an adverb into the class of items which govern a 
rule, a class which contains no other such items. 
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For the difference between~ and also, Horn gives no minimal 
pairs . For one thing, the places where also can appear are fewer 
than those where~ can appear . Specifical.ly, after a negative , 
also usually sounds bad: 
(186) a . • Not also John is c.oming. 
b.??All the troops didn ' t also bomb the village . 
c. *My brother never also heardofBob Dylan . 
In these sentences , even sounds much better. 
This syntactic difference between also and even will also be 
reflected in the lack of syonymy betweenT187a) and (187b), since 
(187b) is not just different in meaning, but is ungrammatical . 
(187) a . Also George didn ' t want to reunite the band . 
b. *Not also George wanted to reunite the band. 
So, in (188a) NEG-ASSOCIATION would put the also right into the scope 
of the not, as in (188b). 
(188) a. I don ' t believe also George wanted to reunite 
the band. 
b . • I believe not also George wanted to reunite the 
band. 
c . I believe also George didn ' t want to reunite the 
band. 
NEG-ASSOCIATION in (188a) would give a reading of (188b), not (188c) . 
Since (188b) is bad , (188a) is not ambiguous, but has only the reading 
without NEG- ASSOCIATION . 
Hor n mentions too as a variant of also in sentence (189) (- Horn's 
(25a)) . 
(189) Abe doesn't believe that Santa too will get here 
until midnight. 
If too is considered as a variant of also, then the restrictions on 
not also seem to be more probably syntiu:tic . Too doesn't appear in 
negati ve environments . In those cases it is suppl emented by either, 
and (190) with either for too is a grammatical sentence . 
(190) a. Abe doesn't believe that Santa either will get 
here unt il midni ght . 
b . Abe believes that not Santa either will get 
here until midnight . 
c . Abe believes that Santa too will not get here 
until midnight . 
(190b), with NEG-ASSOCIATION, sound.s much better than the same sentence 
with also. And in a synonymous sentence with the not next to the 
verb like (190c) too may appear, since it is not in the scope of the 
negative . 
So, there is evidence that the difference between even and also 
may be syntactic, which accounts for the differences in their behavior 
which Horn notices. The data can be given some sort of explanation 
in either framework. 
5 .6. Ordering of the rule. 
5 .6.1. It has been shovn that in order for sentences (161a), (174a) and 
(176a) to receive their correct interpretations, "NEG- ASSOCIATION roust 
operate before the rule of VP-Anaphora. In addition, for sentence 
(143) to be interpreted correctly, NEG-ASSOCIATION must precede the 
rule which interprets tag questions . So far as I know, this creates 
no problems in the ordering of the rules. 
There are some sentences which might suggest that other orderings 
are necessary. For example, in (191) it appears that, since the why not 
(191) Steve doesn't think that the Phillies will win and 
I can guess why not . 
refers to Steve doesn't think that . . . , of NEG-ASSOCIATION would apply, 
it would follow the VP-Anaphora rule. But I claim this could not happen. 
!f the why not indeed refers to Steve . .. , then the first clause is 
reportive and NEG-ASSOCIATION could not have occurred in the sentence. 
On the other hand, if NEG-ASSOCIATION does take place, it will precede 
VP-Anaphora and the why not will refer to why the Phillies won't win . 
So there is no ordering problem there . 
Another possibility is the following type of sentence from R. 
Lakoff (1969) 
(192) Steve doesn't think che Phillies will win , does he? 
Since the tag is formed from the main sentence, it would seem that the 
tag- interpretation rule must precede NEG- ASSOCIATION, contrary to what 
we saw above, if NEG-ASSOCIATIO}I indeed applies to this sentence. In 
fact, Lakoff claims that the NEG-RAISING transformation does apply in 
this sentence, and she avoids the ordering paradox between the two rules 
by making them cyclic . 
But again, I would claim, this is not the case. I maintain that 
sentence (192) may not undergo NEG-ASSOCIATION, and therefore is not 
ambiguous.
The evidence that RID-ASSOCIATION may not apply is given in the 
fact that the main clause is the one from which the tag is formed. 
Since, by the discussion in section 3 . 2.4, we decided that if think 
was being used expressively (which is required for NEG-ASSOCIATION to 
operate), it cannot be questioned. But the tag here would qualify as 
a questioning of think, so it roust be reportive . Hence, NEG-ASSOCIATION 
does not apply t o (192) and it need never follow the tag- interpretation 
rule . 
5. 6 . 2 . There remains the qu_estion of the rule's having to iterate, 
i.e., to apply to its own output. In cases like the following, 
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(193) a. I don ' t believe Archie wants Edith to know 
about this . 
b. I believe Archie doesn't want Edith to know 
about this . 
c . I be:Lieve Archie wants Edith not to know about 
this . 
with either a transformation pulling the negative up, or a semant i c 
interpretation rule moving the negative down, at first glance, it 
seems to make no difference whether the negative is moved in one jump 
or two . The transformaiton case was discussed in section 2.5.3 . 2, 
where it was decided that the rule must work one sentence at a time . 
The interpretive rule may not move the negative downward in the 
semantic interpretation in one move for the exact same reason the trans-
formation can't do it all at once. At each step the proper semantic/ 
expressive forces must be present . G. Lakoff (197oa) spoke of such a 
rule as being anti-cyclic since it would have to apply on each cycle, 
moving downward. But, the option of being an all- at - once iterative 
rule is much more feasible in the case of an interpretive rule. 
Consider the kinds of interpretive rules proposed in Jackendoff 
(1972) . All of them help to build up the semantic interpretation . 
None of t he rule actua:Lly replaces any part of representation that 
already existed (except for dummy elements) l i ke the X in the functional 
or modal structure which is substituted for by the VP-Anaphora rule) . 
The one that Jackendoff uses that could possibly have that effect, the 
rule for coreference, is specifica:Lly constrained to prevent it from 
marking any pairs which have already been marked . Other then that, 
there are no other rules which it would even make sense to apply to 
their own outputs . Thi s contrasts greatl y with syntacti c rul es, which 
are often movements of one type or another and which could conceivably 
go in ways to counteract each other (or themselves) if not constrained 
SOJJl/!how by conditions like strict cyclicity mentioned above. 
So even though the idea of an iterative semantic interpretation 
rule is new, there is no technical reason for excluding it, nor is there 
an intuitive reason. 
6. Conclusions 
This paper has been an attempt to take a closer look at a rule that 
has never had proper justification, even though it has had fairly wide 
acceptance . Since so many analyses have made use of the syntactic rule 
of NID-RAISING, i felt it deserved some justification for its existence. 
AB the published evidence for the rule is reviewed it is seen that 
none of the arguments is without holes . In addition it was seen that 
the rule creates an ordering paradox, in that it must be both cyclic 
and post- cycl ic. In the face of this obstacle, another approach was 
tried . 
A too brief survey was made at the semantic properties of the 
predicates which a:Llow the rule . It is hoped that in the -future, some 
much more adequate way of representing meaning can be found, so that 
per haps the quality of a:Llowing NEG-RAISING will follow from the meaning 
of the predicates alone , rather than having to mark them all, arbitrarily 
for the rule , a scheme which makes absolute:Ly no claims about any 
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semantic characteristics the predicates may share. 
Kimball's observation that only expressive sentences may undergo 
tbe rule vas looked at. It seems to be a correct generalization. 
Kimball, in bis paper, claims that the classification may bave wider 
uses than just for NEG-RAISING; for instance, in the distribution of 
it and~ as pro-sentences. While the prospects of explaining different 
syntactic phenomena by using the distinction betveen expressive and 
reportive sentences seem encouraging, a formalism for representing 
the difference is still unavailable. 
Having run into so many problems vith a syntactic transformation, 
I ma.de an attempt to describe the process using a rule of semantic 
interpretation called NEG-ASSOCIATION, The theoretical framework, that 
of Jackendoff (1972}, vas adopted . 
It vas noticed that certain verbs block tbeir complement sentences 
from dependence on certain modals. This may eventually lead to a 
redefinition of the scopes of tbese modals, but in the meantime, the 
blocking was merely noted for its effect on some semantic rules and 
certain selectional restrictions . , 
A~er the rule of NEG-ASSOCIATION vas formulated, the data vere 
reexamined in the new framework and with the aid of the verb rule. In 
every case, tbe new approach vas able to explain the data at least as 
well as a NEG-RAISING rule could, and in some cases, there seemed to 
be a better account of the facts. 
While this paper cannot and does not attempt to justify the entire 
Interpretive Semantics framework it does aim to sbow that some of tbe 
problems which vere claimed to be unsolvable in this framework (cf. 
G. Lako££ 1970a: f'n. 4) can be handled without any more e££ort than 
Generative Sel!lantics takes, and that new issues can be raised just as 
easily in one framework as in another. As J.ong as a theory continues 
to provide new data to be explained, new questions to be answered, then 
it is a worthwhile channel for research, My intent here is to show 
that Interpretive Semantics is at least that, if not a lot more. 
Footnotes 
*This is a revised version of my M.A. thesis, origina.l..l.y submitted 
in 1974. I would like to mention three people for their assistance 
on this paper. First is Ray Jackendoff, whose ideological illl~uence 
has been very large, both directly arid indirectly. His work has 
inspired me to try to approach this gramma.tical problem frOl!I the angle 
I used. Secondly, my adviser, Arnold Zwicky, has instilled in _me the 
rigor and professionalism I needed to keep from becoming more over-
zealous tban I did. Finally, my wife, Caren, has put up more than her 
share of the bother with this thesis. To these three, thanks a lot . 
l.rbis claim will. be discussed fUrther in section 3.2.4 . 
2.rhis is not always true. It could be claimed that TOPICALIZATION 
can occur without the deletion, giving LEFT DISLOCATION. But most 
movement rules do not have copying counter1iarts. 
3NEG-RAISING is not the only rule whose application would some-
times be ignored for identity purposes. Note also (i) with RAISING, 
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mentioned by Ross (1969) . 
(i) Fred seems to be doing away with somebody but he won't 
say whom. 
and (ii), the well-known example of the type from G. Lakoff (1966) involving 
RAISING and PASSIVE. 
(ii) Sue is believed by everybody to be pregnant, but she 
denies it . 
4As in I don't see the Phillies winning the pennant. 
5As in I don't mean for you to be insulted. 
6Lakoff uses this as a basis for a claim that a semantic inter-
pretation rule could not do the job, since it would have to be governed 
and hence the entire theory of exceptions and minor rul es would have to 
be duplicated in semantics. 
7A more detailed discussion of the issues raised in section 4.1 .1. 
is given in Jackendoff (1972: ch. 1). 
8A11 of the claims made for structures in this section are backed 
up in various places in Jackendof'f (1972) . 
9There are some exceptions , cases where NPs marked with the are 
not specific-as in Claire wants to meet the man of her dreams, where 
the definite NP may still be nonspecific . These exceptions are not 
relevant to this discussion, however. 
lOuntil , it will be remembered, can also be satisfied with a 
durative verb. This will not be considered here. 
11see Jackendoff (1972: ch. 7, fn. 3) for a justification of this 
structure . 
12The verb doubt does not necessaril y block dependence of a 
complement sentence from NEGATIVE. If it does, then the not refers only 
to doubt and ( 137a) will be grammatical (e . g . , as read with heayy 
stress on don't) . 
13:Baker (1970) claims that this 'cancelling out' of two negatives 
must be accomplished by means of logical entailment. I do not know 
what the implications are of including something like that in the 
semantic component of a grammar or even whether it is compatible with 
this system, if indeed he is correct . 
14This discussion ignores the £active homonyms of~ and bother, 
as does Horn. 
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